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This paper examines the impact of South Africa’s state old age pension on the labour sup-
ply of working age members of pension-receiving households. A range of identiﬁcation
strategies are employed in an attempt to make full use of recent labour force survey data.
Results suggest fairly modest, negative impacts on participation and employment on av-
erage, but a pronounced, positive migration impact. As such, they marry the results of
Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003) and Posel, Fairburn and Lund (2006), using more
recent (and nationally-representative) data. Concluding sections consider implications, and
question whether gender-differentiated effects are grounds for rejecting the income-pooling
hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
Eachmonth,over2.2millionelderlySouthAfricansdrawanon-contributorystatepensionwith
an odd history. Instituted in 1928 to help address the “poor white” problem, the pension was
ﬁrstrestrictedtowhitesand“coloureds”withoutprivatepensions,then(in1944)expandedtoin-
clude blacks and Asians, but with discriminatory entitlement criteria and beneﬁts. As apartheid
crumbled in the 1980s, such discrimination became increasingly untenable. To achieve parity,
the government faced a choice between reducing the value of the pension to white recipients or
increasing it to non-whites. It emphasised the latter, most likely because this conferred political
advantages during the negotiation period preceding the democratic transition, and was in line
with a general tendency towards ﬁscal proﬂigacy. By 1993, just before the ﬁrst democratic elec-
tions in April 1994, and after large increases in access and beneﬁts for black pensioners, parity
was essentially achieved. In 1996, new legislation eliminated any vestige of discrimination.1
Thus, as a result of what has been called “a series of accidents” (Deaton 1997), post-apartheid
South Africa inherited what by developing country standards is an unusually generous national
pension scheme. A very unusually generous pension scheme—absorbing around 1.2% of GDP,
with payouts (at 870 rand, or about 120 U.S. dollars, a month) averaging more than twice black
median income per capita. Two other large-scale public transfer programmes exist and have
grown rapidly in recent years, the disability and child support grants (870 rand per month to 1.4
million recipients, and 200 rand to 8 million recipients, respectively). But the old age pension’s
unique combination of coverage and value means that it remains the central pillar of South
Africa’s social welfare dispensation.2
Otherinheritancesfromtheapartheideraarelessbenign. MillionsofSouthAfricansremain
economically marginalised. By the most conservative estimates, involuntary unemployment
stands at over 26%, rising to close to 40% when the “discouraged” unemployed are counted.
These levels of unemployment wreak an incalculable human toll and waste untold economic
potential. Not surprisingly, job creation frequently ranks as South Africans’ top concern in
opinion surveys; in one, 73% of South Africans deﬁned democracy itself as “jobs for everyone”
(Afrobarometer 2000, Human Sciences Research Council 2006). Understanding and improving
the country’s labour market is unequivocally a top priority.
It is in this context that this paper examines the labour market effects of the old age pension
(OAP). Does the relatively generous income support that the pension provides impact labour
supplydecisionsandoutcomes? Ifso, how, inwhatdirection, andbyhowmuch? Theanswersto
these questions illuminate the mechanisms by which public transfers are distributed after their
acquisition by nominal recipients, and the incentives that might be at work in shaping labour
market outcomes. As such, they have clear policy implications, fueling the normative debate
over the efﬁcacy and desirability of social welfare and labour market interventions.
These issues certainly resonate in South Africa, where there is an active discourse over wel-
fare and labour policy reform in the context of widespread recognition of the need to raise
employment. To the extent that the South African case is generalisable, they are also relevant to
the increasing number of developing countries which are able to afford and implement income
support measures of their own.
1For detailed accounts of the history of the pension, see Sagner (2000), Seekings (2003) and Seekings and Nattrass
(2005).
2All ﬁgures as of December 2007. Source: South African Social Security Agency (2007) and own calculations.
21.1 Approach
The rest of this introduction describes key features of the OAP and South African labour mar-
ket. This is followed by a literature review (Section 2) and theoretical discussion (Section 3) of
the possible channels and directions of the OAP’s labour supply effects. Subsequent sections
are empirical, examining the OAP’s associations with, and effects on, labour outcomes in a se-
ries of nationally-representative labour force surveys. A number of identiﬁcation strategies are
adopted—partial correlations in the most recent available survey that meets data requirements
(Section 4), non-parametric discontinuity design (Section 5), and longitudinal analysis (Section
6). All have limitations, and the approach is essentially exploratory, aiming to deliver an accu-
mulation of evidence based on fully exploiting the capabilities of the data. Concluding sections
provide a summary of ﬁndings, and address some of their implications.
Since apartheid’s appalling legacy currently makes it impossible to ignore race in economic
analysis in South Africa, and for reasons discussed in Section 1.3, analysis is limited to black
Africans only.3
1.2 Features of the State Pension
1.2.1 Pension Sharing
It is not wise to be on your own. If you have got money, pension money or whatsoever,
you have to share it. – 75-year old pensioner, quoted in Sagner and Mtati (1999).
A priori, one might be be skeptical about the likelihood of the OAP having substantial labour
market effects. After all, the OAP is certainly not intended to be a labour market intervention,
and its nominal target is the elderly, whose labour supply is of second-order importance to the
country’s aggregate labour endowment. In fact, the direct impact of the pension on the elderly is
notthefocushere. In2004,just7%ofpensionerslivedalone,whileover80%livedinhouseholds
containing one or more 19–50 year-olds. Households containing pensioners are, in fact, larger
than average. An extensive economics literature, reviewed in Section 2, establishes that the OAP
plays a pivotal income support role for many families; in the absence of comprehensive social
security (particularly for the long-term unemployed), the OAP has evolved into a signiﬁcant
income support system for the general poor, including adults across the working age range.4
Sociologists and political scientists agree; for example, Sagner and Mtati (1999) gather qual-
itative evidence of extensive sharing of pension income in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. They ﬁnd
that important social and cultural drivers of pension-sharing include kinship norms encouraging
altruistic resource-sharing, and reciprocity-based motivations arising from the use of pension in-
come to lessen the sense of dependency suffered by frail elderly who feel that their care needs
are (or will be) an imposition on younger relatives.
1.2.2 Determinants of Take-up
The OAP is non-contributory and funded out of general taxation, and in this sense is a pure
income transfer scheme. It is means-tested on income and assets, and so is explicitly targeted
3About 80% of households receiving the OAP classify themselves as black.
4Unemployment support is limited to a mandatory, contributory unemployment insurance fund for workers in
formal employment, providing temporary support after job loss.
3at poorer individuals. However, the test is applied only to prospective pensioners and their
partners, not to total household income or assets if pensioners live with other relatives. Pension
beneﬁts are reduced in proportion to income as a pensioner’s wealth (and that of their partner)
approaches the maximum imposed by the means test, whereupon beneﬁts fall to zero. However,
the means-test is generous enough to be non-binding for the vast majority of prospective black
recipients, whoalmostalwaysqualifyforthemaximumpensionamount.5 Thus, whiletheOAP
is certainly redistributive within the country as a whole, it is less so within the subset of black
households. Eligibility rules do not stipulate that recipients should not work, so the pension
imposes no implicit tax on labour for the vast majority of recipients (that is, provided that
working does mean crossing the maximum income imposed by the means test). The criterion
that does tend to bind is age, with women becoming eligible at age 60 and men at age 65.
These institutional features are very attractive from the point of view of estimating the pen-
sion’s causal effects. For many black households, the pension can essentially be construed as an
exogenous income transfer conditioned only on age. More generally, pension receipt is certainly
not randomly distributed in the population, but it is based on explicit, systematic, and observ-
able criteria. This would be a glib statement if some variation in pension take-up arose from
differences in knowledge about its availability, rendering pension receipt endogenous if knowl-
edge was correlated with relevant outcomes. It would also be inaccurate if there was stigma
associated with pension receipt, reducing the appeal of the pension to households and perhaps
causing some to self-select out of the scheme (see Sahn and Alderman (1996), for Sri Lanka).
But because of the pension’s long history and attractive size, knowledge about its availability
is near-universal, and the fact that the means test is non-binding for a large majority of elderly
black individuals makes receipt stigma less likely. Indeed, take-up rates amongst age-eligible
individuals now approach 100%.
Allofthissaid, participationintheschemeisnotdeterminedentirelybyitsnominalcriteria.
At the time of the surveys used here, pension administration rested with the local ofﬁces of nine
provincial social welfare departments, introducing the potential for regional discretion in eligi-
bility criteria enforcement.6 There is evidence that the means test is not universally applied, par-
ticularly if applicants appear poor. This is one reason why almost everyone drawing a pension
receives the maximum payout amount. There is also evidence of breaches of the age criterion,
through lack of enforcement (anecdotal evidence suggests that the appearance of old age is of-
ten enough), cheating on the part of prospective recipients (by misleading administrators about
their age), or through collusion between age-ineligible recipients and ofﬁcials. Non-pecuniary
transaction costs may also discourage some would-be recipients from drawing pension income;
pensioners must either draw income from provision points on payment days (often involving
long hours in outdoor queues), or appoint procurators to act on their behalf. Again, the high
value of the pension and high take-up rates argue against this being a material problem for esti-
mation, but it is certainly possible that some pensioners occasionally miss payments, or lose out
on pension income altogether.
5In 2004, the key year of analysis used here, individual assets were limited to 280,800 rand (excluding the value
of place of residence, if owned) and annual income to 19,128 rand. For married pensioners, the corresponding limits
were 561,600 rand and 34,806.48 rand. The average rand/dollar exchange rate in 2004 was approximately 6.60.
6On 1 April 2006 a new, centralised South African Social Security Agency became responsible for grants and
pension administration.
41.3 Labour Market Features
Evidence points to continued racial labour market segmentation in South Africa, arising for a
variety of (not fully understood) reasons (Naudé and Serumaga-Zake 2001, Kingdon and Knight
2004a). This analysis abstracts from these issues by focusing on only black individuals, amongst
whom the unemployment problem is concentrated; high average unemployment masks enor-
mous differences in rates by race—ofﬁcial black unemployment was 31.3% in September 2004,
compared to 5.4% for whites (Statistics South Africa 2005).
High structural unemployment, perhaps the labour market’s most striking feature, chal-
lenges the applicability of standard notions of labour supply choice. A debate has raged over
whether unemployment ought to be conceived as excluding (“narrow” unemployment) or in-
cluding (“broad” unemployment) those without work who say they would accept a job if they
were offered one, but have not recently been engaged in active job search.7 This distinction
is enormously important in South Africa—black unemployment was 17% higher by the latter
deﬁnition in 2004.8 Narrow unemployment is widely used (and has been South Africa’s ofﬁcial
measure since 1998), primarily because active job search is often assumed to constitute revealed
preference for labour participation (while merely stating a desire to work might be cheap talk).
But it is possible that this distinction breaks down under conditions of very high involuntary
unemployment where, even if the desire to work is strong, giving up active job search could
be a rational response to very low expected success probabilities and signiﬁcant psychic and
pecuniary search costs. Kingdon and Knight (2006) evaluate whether the non-searching unem-
ployed ought to be considered participants. Finding that they are no richer or happier than the
searching unemployed, and that their presence affects local wage rates, they conclude that they
should. I follow the implications of their ﬁndings by deﬁning labour force participation and
unemployment broadly.
2 OAP Literature9
2.1 Poverty and Resource Allocation
In a seminal paper, Case and Deaton (1998) ﬁnd that the OAP is strongly redistributive, and a
major source of income support for poor children (because many live in three-generation house-
holds with pensioners). The impacts of pension and non-pension income on food expenditure
are compared to determine whether pension income is treated differently to other income. Re-
sults suggest that it is not. However, gender is revealed to be an important determinant of
household spending patterns, leading Case and Deaton (1998) to reject the perfect incoming
pooling hypothesis, and thus the unitary household decision-making model, for the sampled
households.10
Maitra and Ray (2003a) revisit the questions posed by Case and Deaton (1998), paying par-
ticular attention to the potential interplay between private transfers and the OAP. They ﬁnd
that private income has a large impact on poverty and household expenditure patterns, while
OAP income has no discernable impact on expenditure patterns. Hence, they reject the income
7The typical reference period is four weeks.
8Own calculation based on the September 2004 Labour Force Survey.
9For an alternative, concise overview of OAP research themes and ﬁndings, see Burns, Keswell and Leibbrandt
(2005).
10This, along with other household models, is reviewed in Section 3.
5pooling hypothesis. In this they differ from Case and Deaton (1998), who also reject the uni-
tary household model, but do so because expenditure patterns differ by the gender of income
recipients, not because they ﬁnd that OAP and other income are spent differently. Maitra and
Ray (2003a) ﬁnd that the OAP only partially crowds out private transfers for poor households,
while for the non-poor private and public transfers are complements.
Jensen (2003) uses the OAP to examine whether public transfers crowd out private trans-
fers. Large but “far from complete” crowding out is obtained—every 1 rand of pension income
reduces private transfers by 0.25–0.3 rand. Some of Jensen’s (2003) evidence conﬂicts with that
presented by Posel et al. (2006), summarised below. There, the OAP is associated with posi-
tive, female migrant labour supply (and has no other signiﬁcant effects on labour supply) while
Jensen (2003) ﬁnds no evidence of the OAP increasing the number of migrants.
2.1.1 Child Welfare
Building on preliminary evidence from Case and Deaton (1998), Duﬂo (2000) examines the
impact of the OAP on anthropometric child development indicators. Children (especially girls)
see a signiﬁcant improvement in health, but only if the OAP recipient is female. According to
Duﬂo, these results “show that an exogenous increase in income can improve children’s health
in developing countries” (p.398).
Edmonds (2006) notes that future pension income is highly predictable and exploits this to
testforthepresenceofliquidityconstraintsinhouseholds’childlabourandschoolingdecisions—
if households are forward-looking and not liquidity constrained, receipt of the OAP should not
triggerachangeinthesevariables. ChildactivitiesinhouseholdsthatareeligiblefortheOAPare
compared to households that are nearly eligible (the premise being that these households have
almost identical permanent incomes, but a temporary difference in income availability). Results
suggest a large increase in schooling, and decrease in labour, for rural children. Edmonds (2006)
concludes that the sampled rural households face liquidity constraints, an argument bolstered
by the fact that signiﬁcant child schooling and labour effects occur only when the ﬁrst of two
potential OAP recipients in the household becomes eligible.
2.2 Labour Supply
Bertrand et al. (2003) frame the OAP as a natural experiment enabling the testing of intrahouse-
hold resource allocation in developing economies. To do this, the effects of OAP receipt on the
labour supply of 16–50 year-old household members are investigated. Descriptive statistics on
their (1993) data yield evidence of labour supply discontinuities at the point at which household
members become age-eligible for the OAP. Instrumenting pension receipt by the number of age-
eligible household members, and controlling for age, education, province, location (urban, ru-
ral and metropolitan), gender, household size, and household composition, the paper ﬁnds that
OAP eligibility is associated with strong negative effects on hours worked and employment sta-
tus. In particular, employment and conditional labour supply elasticities of pension income of
-0.55 and -0.53 are obtained. The authors note that although these elasticities appear quite large,
they are likely to partly reﬂect the low probability of job search success in South Africa, driving
down the opportunity cost of leisure. Repeating the exercise with gender-disaggregated data,
Bertrand et al. (2003) ﬁnd that OAP eligibility in the household is associated with a greater re-
duction in male than female labour supply. In addition, female pensioners reduce labour supply
6more than male pensioners. Like Case and Deaton (1998), the ﬁnding of gender-differentiated
pension effects leads them to reject the family income pooling hypothesis.
Posel et al. (2006) suggest that Bertrand et al.’s (2003) results are ﬂawed by an inappropriately
restrictive deﬁnition of the household. By considering only individuals physically present in the
place of residence for more than half a month prior to the survey, they argue, the study neglects
the potential labour supply response of those who move for work, which in the South African
context (involving an historical pattern of migrant labour and concentration of jobs in urban
areas) is likely to be important (cf. Jensen (2003)). Posel et al. (2006) thus revisit Bertrand et
al.’s (2003) study, using the same data and methodology, but considering a restricted sample of
three-generation rural households, including non-resident members. In the aggregate, they ﬁnd
that OAP eligibility has no household labour supply effect. Disaggregating by gender, they ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant and positive effect on (only) female labour supply. Summarising, they conclude
that they ﬁnd “no convincing evidence that the social pension creates disincentives for prime-
age individuals to migrate to work or to ﬁnd work” (p.852). And they reason that their positive,
female migrant labour supply result stems from the OAP’s inﬂuence in overcoming “income
constraints to migration” (ibid.), and the newfound ability of pension-receiving grandmothers
to look after their daughters’ children. This conjecture is compatible with the ﬁndings of Duﬂo
(2000), and Edmonds, Mammen and Miller (2005) (see below).
Lam, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod (2005) and Ranchhod (2006) examine the the labour supply
of elderly, OAP-eligible adults. For the reasons outlined in Section 1.2.2, they argue that any
labour supply effects must essentially be pure income effects. They ﬁnd that labour participa-
tion rates decline steeply with age for both men and women over 50. Hazard rates for labour
force exit peak at 40% and 35% for women and men at their respective OAP eligibility age
thresholds, in line with OECD averages at pension-eligibility ages. Probit regressions indicate
discrete reductions in labour supply (on the order of 5–10%) at pension eligibility ages.
2.3 Household Composition
There is evidence of ﬂux in household formation in South Africa. Wittenberg and Collinson
(2005) document signiﬁcant reductions in average household size since 1995. Sagner (2000)
presents ﬁeldwork evidence from the Eastern Cape province of household fragmentation arising
from the departure of members to seek employment, and the enduring effects of apartheid era
residential restrictions. Klasen and Woolard (2000) argue that household formation is a central
survival strategy for the unemployed.
Does the pension play a role in this regard? Klasen and Woolard (2000) ﬁnd that state pen-
sions“increase thelikelihood ofattractingunemployed personsto ahousehold”(p.1), while“the
linkages between pension and remittance income and search and employment prospects oper-
ate via changes in household formation, rather than directly via an increase in the reservation
wage” (p.19). The possible role of the pension in encouraging migration has already been out-
lined (Posel et al. 2006), also suggesting that household composition may change with pension
income. Assessing this, Edmonds et al. (2005) ﬁnd that female pension eligibility is associated
with an increase in the number of children aged 0–5, an increase in the number of women 18–23
(that is, around typical ﬁrst motherhood age), and a decrease in the number of women 30–39 in
households. At approximately 10% on average, the magnitudes of these changes are substantial.
Edmonds et al. (2005) posit that the two women groups are substitutes in household produc-
tion, but that the older group have a comparative advantage in work away from home (perhaps
7arising from fewer child care obligations). In contrast to Jensen (2003), such household change
arising from the OAP suggests a migrant labour response may be occurring, which would be in
line with Posel et al.’s (2006) results.
MaitraandRay(2003b)alsochallengetheconceptionofthehouseholdasexogenouslygiven,
and use 1990s panel data to assess whether resource inﬂows (including the OAP) change house-
hold composition. They ﬁnd evidence that household composition is rather mutable, and that
pension income leads to a reduction in working-age resident adults in the household (contra
Klasen and Woolard (2000)). They speculate that “the expanding social pensions program in
South Africa encourages working age adults to leave their elderly parents in the villages in search
of jobs in the cities” (p.1046). Pursuing this theme, Maitra and Inder (2004) ﬁnd that migration
is indeed more likely when a household receives the OAP, noting that pensioner gender has
different effects on prospective male and female migrants.
Two clear, potential sources of endogenous household change with respect to the OAP thus
emerge. The ﬁrst is that pension income results in working age family members migrating
from the household, in order to seek employment or take-up pre-arranged job opportunities
elsewhere. The second is that the pension acts as an attractor to non-resident family members,
causing them to relocate into pension-receiving households to survive unemployment.
2.4 Literature Summary
The literature is in agreement that the OAP provides redistributive income support to a large
number of poor households, that the value of pension income to these households is large rel-
ative to other sources of income, that there are tangible behavioural responses to this, and that
the gender of the pension recipient matters. But there is disagreement about whether or not
pension money is spent the same way as other income (Case and Deaton (1998) versus Maitra
and Ray (2003a)). Regardless of the answer to this question, the fact that gender matters has led,
via a rejection of the income pooling hypothesis, to a near consensus that the unitary model of
household resource allocation is a poor description of recipient households.
The OAP may change families’ living arrangements, but there is no agreement on how. It
does seem, however, that there is a migration response, while migrant workers, whether their
labour market status is independent of the OAP or itself partly a product of it, appear to cut
back their transfers to the household with the arrival of the OAP (at least, according to Maitra
and Ray (2003a), for very poor households).
The few studies devoted to the OAP’s labour impact are divided—two ﬁnd strong, negative
labour supply effects, one suggests that there are positive effects, while Jensen (2003), investi-
gating crowding out, ﬁnds no evidence that the surge in the OAP’s value for black recipients
between 1989 and 1993 changed labour supply at all.
3 Theory
3.1 Analytical Framework
Ultimately, individuals are the agents of interest when considering the effects of public trans-
fers on labour outcomes. But the OAP is targeted at people at retirement age and any effects
on individuals other than pensioners themselves must be mediated through their access to pen-
sioners’ OAP incomes, or by the derivative impact of pensioners’ own uses of the OAP. The
pension’s effects, in other words, are channeled through households. There is thus a tension
8when evaluating the effects of the OAP between analysis at the level of the individual (whose
labour outcomes are of ultimate interest) and the household (because the household is both itself
also a potentially interesting unit of analysis, and integral to understanding how a policy might
affect those to whom it is not nominally directed).
Figure1providesasimpleviewofthewayinwhichpensionincomemightinﬂuenceindivid-
uallabouroutcomeswithinthehousehold. Afteranelderlyhouseholdmemberreceivespension
income, decisions over to whom it is allocated, and how to use it, are made. This is likely to
be linked to the availability of other (wage and non-wage) income. In parallel, the pension may
induce people to depart or arrive, a dynamic which may both be dependent upon, and affect, in-
trahousehold resource allocation. The process of income allocation within the household is, at
the same time, bound up with the labour market outcomes of its constituent individuals, which
both drive income availability, and may be (partly) determined by it. The picture that emerges is
of a potentially complex set of decisions and outcomes over the internal allocation of resources,
composition of household members, and labour outcomes of those members. But as posited by
the diagram, it is reasonable to assume that pension income is itself exogenous.11
Figure 1 identiﬁes three distinct groups of household members whose labour market out-
comes may be affected by the OAP:
i. Pensioners. This association is not automatically determined, because the pension’s rules do
not stipulate retirement;
ii. Individuals of working, pre-pension (“prime”) age;
iii. Young (pre-working age) individuals, whose future labour outcomes may be affected by ac-
cess to pension income in childhood.
The presumption here is that (ii.) is both of ﬁrst-order importance, and amenable to rigorous
assessment using available data.
3.2 Household Decision-making Models
In our family we live better, my brother maintains us and my mother gets the pen-
sion. – Anonymous young woman, Limpopo Province, quoted in Mturi, Xaba and
Sekokotla (2005)
How does the family manage the potentially complex interactions outlined above to arrive at
(ii.), the outcome of interest? That is, how ought the process of decision-making within the
household that leads to potential OAP effects on prime-age individuals be conceptualised? And
what implications do competing conceptions have for expectations of the pension’s effects?
3.2.1 Unitary Model and Implications
The canonical theory is the unitary model, encompassing a swathe of theories with the common
feature that the household behaves as if it were maximising a single utility function (Bergstrom
1997). Such a framework is appropriate if all household members have identical preferences, if
there is an “ethical consensus” in households that guides economic decision-making (Samuelson
1956), or if a single member’s preferences rule.
11The exception occurs when the means test is enforced and pensioners’ incomes are sufﬁcient to make the test
bind. As discussed in Section 1.2.2, however, this is the case for very few households and, even if enforced, the means
test applies only to pensioners’ (not other family members’) incomes. I also discount the possibility that pensioners
themselves join households as a result of labour outcomes and income allocations.
9The unitary model makes strong predictions about the impact of pension income.12 For
simplicity, assume that pension income is the only source of non-wage income in a household
comprising a pensioner and a prime-age adult. Assume also that, for exogenous reasons, the
pensioner is not in the labour force. In a unitary model in which time can be spent consuming
leisure13 or providing market labour, such a household faces the optimisation problem:
Max
C,L
U(C,L) subject to C +wLP +wL0 (1)
where U(C,L) is (quasi-concave) household utility, a function of aggregate consumption C and
leisure L, w is the wage, P is pension income, and L0 is the prime-age adult’s time endowment.
The budget constraint requires consumption and the (shadow) value of leisure to be no more
than the value of the pension and maximum obtainable wage income. Kuhn-Tucker conditions





C+wL =P +wL0 (3)







mum wage satisfying this condition is the reservation wage, ¯ w. It is easy to show that d ¯ w
dP >0 if
leisure is a normal good, and d ¯ w
dP <0 if leisure is inferior. More generally, if leisure is a normal
(inferior) good, labour supply will decline (rise) with pension income. The result of this simple
unitary household model with respect to pension income is thus exactly analogous to that of the
standard, static neoclassical model of individual labour supply, in which the individual enjoys an
exogenous increase in non-wage income. It will also generalise to households with multiple pen-
sioners and working-age individuals, because the utilities and labour supplies of all individuals
are subsumed in the aggregate (household) utility function and budget constraint.
The unitary model has a further, key implication. Adding an additional pensioner to our







With P1 = P2 it clearly makes no difference to the household’s choice of the prime-age family
member’s optimal labour supply who the recipients of the pension are. Pensioner gender, for
example, is irrelevant. Analagously, in the previous (single pensioner) speciﬁcation outlined, the
source of P makes no difference to ¯ w. This is an example of income pooling, a general result of
unitary household models that suggests that income sources are irrelevant to consumption and
production allocations. As evidenced by Section 2, income pooling tends to be rejected empiri-
12The following exposition closely follows Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001).
13Where “leisure” describes any non-earning activity, a weakness discussed in Section 8.
10cally, an important cause (along with unease about the aggregation of individual preference into
a communal utility function) of skepticism about the model’s validity (Bergstrom 1997, Cahuc
and Zylberberg 2001).
3.3 Collective Models and Implications
Collective models revert to the more conventional paradigm of individual decision-making,
while taking cognisance of the importance of individuals’ relationships with other household
members. To provide a simple example, I adapt the general speciﬁcation provided in Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2001), due to Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992). Consider our earlier
household comprising a working-age individual, now denoted y (young), and a pensioner, now
denoted a (aged). Using Chiappori’s (1988) proposition 1, and assuming that y retains all their
wage income (though see Section 3.4, below), y’s pareto efﬁcient labour choice arises from the
solution to the individual constrained optimisation problem:
Max
Cy,Ly
Uy(Cy,Ly) subject to Cy +wLy wL0+y (6)
where  is a “sharing rule” for pension income and y +a = P. Again, the model can be
generalised straightforwardly to cater for more household members. Household labour supply,
then, arises from individual optimisation programmes, each of which depends on individuals’
shares of non-wage income. The key question becomes how, for any number of household
members i, income shares i are determined. Individuals might simply obtain equal shares, but
it is more common to assume that shares arise from a bargaining process. This can be modeled
explicitly (non-cooperative bargaining models), or using an axiomatic (cooperative bargaining)
approach (almost always maintaining the assumption of pareto efﬁciency), such as applying the
Nash Bargaining Solution.
In a typical collective model, then, and in sharp contrast to the unitary model, the identities
ofpensionersandworkersarelikelytobeimportantinpredictingpensioneffects. Returningthe
simple example of y and a, these will contribute through bargaining dynamics to y, and hence
to y’s optimal labour supply decision. Two pensioner characteristics which may contribute to
the allocation of pension income to the prime-age household member are:
- altruism, in the speciﬁc sense of how much the pensioner values y’s utility relative to their
own. The more other-regarding they are, the higher y, all else equal; and
- how easily the pensioner may be coerced into giving up pension income or, equivalently, their
degree of bargaining power. All else equal, the lower the pensioner’s bargaining power, the
higher y.
Age may play a deep role in determining sharing rules, with cultural norms generating ex-
pectations about elderly household members’ obligations to support younger relatives (a kind
of norms-based altruism) and their relative standing—bargaining power—in the household (lo-
calised, qualitative evidence in Sagner and Mtati (1999) suggests some possibilities). Gender is
also often considered a plausible source of variation in sharing rules. In particular, a common
supposition is that women are more altruistic, and have lower bargaining power in the house-
hold, than men (and this may be equally true for the elderly). Section 7 examines the gender
dimension in detail.
11Working-age individual—y—characteristics may also clearly play a role in sharing rule de-
termination. Judgements of the appropriate levels of income support to provide working-age
relatives may depend on their ages (with younger individuals seeking ﬁrst-time employment,
for example, thought to merit more support). Under more sophisticated notions of individuals’
activity sets than considered above, sharing rules may also be affected by the contribution of in-
dividualstonon-incomeearningbutnonethelessvaluedactivities(peopleperforminghousehold
chores and raising children may receive larger transfers than those earning wage income). Very
generally, perceptions of an individual’s need for income seem likely to be an element of sharing
rules. This raises the possibility that family members might be incentivised to “remain needy”
(Kingdon and Knight 2004b). The OAP might induce voluntary unemployment amongst those
for whom the utility gleaned from consumption based on OAP income, in conjunction with
leisure, exceeds the utility from supplying labour, given the concomitant drop in access to OAP
income and leisure.
Regardless of which factors dominate, the fundamental implication of collective decision-
making models for an understanding of how the OAP might affect prime-age workers’ labour
outcomes is that the size of y (or relevant model-speciﬁc determinant of working individuals’
access to pension income) determines the magnitude of the pension’s effect on optimal indi-
vidual labour supply, and that this could depend on pensioners’ and working-age individuals’
characteristics. As long as
@ y
@ P > 0, however, P will exert a standard income effect, yielding
negative labour supply incentive effects if leisure is a normal good.
3.4 Retained Income
Children of today, they are more occupied with themselves. You know, as we are getting
the pension, we have to pay for the accounts, but with their money they just buy their
items. – 74-year old pensioner, quoted in Sagner and Mtati (1999).
One possibility which the above models ignore is that the pension may relieve relatives of the
burden of providing income support to elderly family members. Put another way, ﬁnancial
obligations may ﬂow from prime-age family members to the elderly, not the reverse. If elderly
householders rely on working relatives in this way, workers’ retained incomes could rise in
response to pension income. The unitary household model obscures this potential effect by
treating individuals’ labour supply decisions as an outcome of aggregate utility maximisation,
and the collective model above obscures it by imagining that sharing rules apply only to non-
wage income.
The essential feature of such a scenario is that the worker cares about the wellbeing of the
prospective pensioner. One way to imagine its implications, therefore, is to revert to y’s indi-
vidual optimisation problem, where an additional constraint faced by y in maximising her own
utility is the provision of some minimum (ﬁxed) level of utility to a, ¯ Ua. With ¯ Ua money-metric
utility for simplicity, optimisation entails:
Max
Cy,Ly
Uy(Cy,Ly) subject to Cy +wLy + ¯ Ua wL0 (7)
Introducing the pension, let T = ¯ Ua  P (where T is the worker’s transfer. The worker seeks
only to preserve ¯ Ua, and so the pension crowds out their transfer one-to-one):
12Max
Cy,Ly
Uy(Cy,Ly) subject to Cy +wLy + ¯ Ua P wL0 (8)
P is thus analogous to a negative y in the collective model of Section 3.3; as in that model, it is
easy to show that the usual income effects therefore apply—desired labour supply is decreasing
in P if leisure is a normal good.
Theworker’sobligationtoanelderlyrelativeismodeledaboveasarequirementtoguarantee
a minimum level of utility. Another natural way to think of that obligation is as an implicit, ad
valorem tax on wage income, so that the elderly member is supported by some ﬁxed proportion
of wages. This is reasonable if, for example, elderly wellbeing is partly reference-based. Stated
more prosaically, if my elderly mother lives under the same roof, I may want to increase (or be
unable to prevent increasing) her consumption as my earnings increase. In this case, pension
income will attenuate the standard incentive effects of a wage tax.
Thus, if the pension reduces the ﬁnancial burden imposed by the elderly on workers, this
could increase or decrease desired labour supply, depending on whether that burden consists
of a lump-sum transfer to the elderly or an ad valorem tax on workers’ wages, and on whether
the demand for leisure rises or falls with income. The same effects will apply if pensioners use
their newfound pension income to support not just themselves, but other household members
formerly reliant on workers’ wage incomes; young children are an obvious possibility, adults
who are unable to work are another.
3.5 Unemployment and Job Search
In the above static labour supply models, market clearing and perfect information mean that de-
siredlaboursupplyisalwaysactualised. Therearejusttwolabourmarketstates—non-participation
and participation. But when there is signiﬁcant involuntary unemployment, as in South Africa,
adesiretoworkdoesnotguaranteetheopportunitytodoso,andanotherstateexists—involuntary
unemployment. People in this category face a choice over how much effort, and how many re-
sources, to devote to acquiring a job. It seems plausible to imagine that in doing so, prospective
workers trade off the expected beneﬁts and costs (pecuniary and pyschic), of job search. This
suggests that job search “intensity” is a continuum (rather than a binary choice of search or
non-search), which is the fundamental source of the confusion described in Section 1 over the
appropriate distinction between unemployment and non-participation. If high involuntary un-
employment suppresses the expected success rate of job search, and the costs of search are high,
the appeal of job search will be low even if prospective workers would like to swap leisure for
consumption.
A straightforward formalisation clariﬁes the potential impacts of the OAP on job search.14
Assume that an unemployed individual expects employment to yield an exogenously-given wage
w. As before, there is a reservation wage ¯ w, which by standard result depends on non-wage
income (denote this R, so ¯ w = ¯ w(R), and with leisure a normal good,
@ ¯ w(R)
@ R >0).
The individual thus accepts a job only if w > ¯ w(R). Denote by q the probability that a job
offer satisﬁes this condition (q( ¯ w(R))=Prob(w > ¯ w(R)), q ¯ w( ¯ w(R))<0 and, by the chain rule,
qR( ¯ w(R))<0). The wage expected from an accepted job is therefore E(wjw > ¯ w(R)), which I
denote we.
14For simplicity, and without loss of generality, I adopt a static rather than dynamic job search choice model.
13The probability of obtaining a job offer, p, is a function of the level of search s, with dimin-
ishing marginal returns. Finally, the cost of search, c, is also a function of search level, increasing
on the margin. The expected, net beneﬁt of search is thus:
p(s)fq( ¯ w(R)).(we +R)+[1 q( ¯ w(R))].Rg+[1  p(s)].R c(s), (9)
with ﬁrst order condition (foc): p0(s)[q( ¯ w(R)).we]=c0(s) (10)
Optimal search, then, simply equates the beneﬁt and cost of search at the margin, adjusted for
the shift term q( ¯ w(R)).we, which depends on w and ¯ w (itself dependent on R). It can be shown
that q()we is a decreasing function of ¯ w(R).
The role of the pension depends upon how it enters into this calculation. I outline four
plausible cases.
3.5.1 Case 1: Unconditional access to pension income
If the individualhas access to some share of pensionincome () regardless of theirlabour market
status, pension income is a component of R, which has a negative impact on optimal job search
through the negative relation between the reservation wage and q()we. The intuition behind
such a reservation wage effect is that access to additional non-wage income makes jobsearch “less
urgent”, reducing optimal search intensity.
3.5.2 Case 2: Conditional access to pension income
AsdiscussedinSection3.3, aplausiblealternativeisthataccesstopensionincomeisneeds-based,
so that an unemployed family member acquires a greater share of pension income than a worker.
To expose the effect by evaluating its logical extreme, assume that access to a share of pension
income is the only income obtained when unemployed, and that when employed the worker’s
share of pension income is zero. Then the net beneﬁt expression 9, above, becomes (R is lost
when a job is taken):
p(s)fq( ¯ w(R)).we +[1 q( ¯ w(R))].Rg+[1  p(s)].R c(s) , (11)
with foc: p0(s)[q( ¯ w(R)).(we  R)]=c0(s) (12)
The only difference between this and ﬁrst-order condition 10 is a change in the shift term from
q()we to q()(we  R). By inspection, then, conditional access to pension income (such that
pension income is reduced when the individual is employed) reduces optimal search intensity,
and does so more than in the unconditional access case.
3.5.3 Case 3: Retained Income
Section 3.4 raises the possibility that the pension boosts workers’ retained incomes (wages net
of transfers to family members). This lifts the expected net beneﬁt of working proportionately,
whether workers’ initial obligations take the form of a lump sum transfer to other family mem-
bers, or an implicit tax on earnings. Adopt, for example, the latter, with t the family member
“tax” on earnings. Then the relevant wage is net of this tax, and could be denoted wt =w(1 t),
14with
@ wt
@ t < 0, and new terms qt() = Prob(wt > ¯ w(R)) and E(wtjwt > ¯ w(R)) = we
t . The net
beneﬁt calculation is then:
p(s)
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So if the pension reduces t, the optimal job search level increases, since qt( ¯ w(R))we
t is a negative
function of t by previously-described relations.
3.5.4 Case 4: Liquidity-constrained Search
A ﬁnal possibility is that the individual is initially liquidity constrained. She wishes to select
optimal search effort according to condition 10, but cannot afford the resultant optimal search
cost, so that p0(s)[q( ¯ w(R)).we]>c0(s). Access to pension income might loosen such a liquidity
constraint, allowing a welfare-enhancing increase in search, closer to or at the optimum.
The pension might thus plausibly have negative (case 1 or 2), positive (case 3 or 4), or even
neutral (if a combination of cases is at work), effects on job search.
3.6 Additional Effects
3.6.1 Latent Productivity
A large literature in development economics shows how limited opportunities for productivity-
enhancing self-investment (such as adequate nutrition) may lock prospective workers in poverty
traps. Given their low marginal products, such workers may earn wages that are too low to
enable them to break out of a low-productivity, low-wage cycle. In a more extreme scenario,
they may ﬁnd themselves shut out of the labour market altogether, even in competitive general
equilibrium (Dasgupta and Ray 1986). If OAP income enabled prospective or existing workers
to improve their latent productivity, the OAP could break poverty traps by enabling labour
market access or higher wages. This could manifest as a higher probability of employment for
given levels of participation or search intensity.
Attitudes to risk might also be altered by the pension. If the pension, by providing an in-
come buffer, boosted workers’ appetites for risk and enabled them to absorb more stochastic
output ﬂuctuation, this could have positive consequences for workers’ incomes (for example, by
enabling piece-rate rather than ﬁxed-wage contracts, or ﬁxed-rent rather than share-cropping
contracts in agriculture [though the latter has little importance in South Africa]). Labour
migration—an especially costly and risky form of job search—may be importantly affected.
3.6.2 General Equilibrium Effects
The pension’s scope (approximately 1.2% of GDP, and a major contributor to total income in
small communities) may be big enough to generate aggregate effects. In a simple, closed econ-
omy Keynesian framework, it would constitute an exogenous income injection, lifting aggregate
demand and boosting ﬁrms’ output. Aggregate derived labour demand would rise in response,
and with it equilibrium employment and wages. This would be especially true if the pension re-
distributed income to poorer households with above-average marginal propensities to consume.
On the other hand, if perfect price ﬂexibility was assumed, such demand increases would merely
15raise prices. These effects might occur at a local or regional level, but this is macroeconomic,
general equilibrium territory, depending crucially on assumptions ranging from price formation
and ﬂexibility, to the degree of economic openness, and how the pension is funded.
3.7 Theory Summary
Prime-age workers are affected by pension income through their relationships with pensioners,
making household decision-making, and speciﬁcally resource allocation, central to predictions
of the OAP’s effects. In their simplest forms, both the unitary and collective models predict
OAP effects on working-age household members that are analogous to pure income effects on
individuals. Under the standard assumption of leisure as a normal good, the implication is that
labour supply declines and participation (at the margin) falls.
If individual incentives are considered (in line with models of individual, or collective house-
hold, decision-making), pension income may relieve workers of the burden of supporting family
members. This will have the same (income) effect as described above if the pension crowds out
ﬁxed lump sum transfers from workers to pensioners; if it reduces the rate of a continuous “tax”
imposed on workers by dependents, it will boost (reduce) desired labour supply under condi-
tions of dominant substitution (income) effects and leisure as a normal good. Job search is a
key labour variable that might be affected by the pension, and a range of different effects are
possible. Finally, the pension might boost prospective or current workers’ potential marginal
products, and alter aggregate labour demand in general equilibrium.
The above discussion clearly echoes the lack of consensus in the empirical OAP literature.
Arguably, the lack of an unambiguous theoretical prior over the vector of the OAP’s effects
makes an exploratory, rather than strictly hypothesis-driven, empirical approach appropriate.
This is the task of the analysis to follow. But along with the dictates of available data, this ba-
sic theory informs the choice of which labour market outcomes to analyse, guides regression
speciﬁcation, and facilitates interpretation of empirical results. Theoretical priors point to po-
tentialOAPeffectsonlabourparticipation, thelikelihoodofemployment(incorporatingsearch
effects), and labour supply conditional on employment.
4 Parametric Cross-section Evidence
4.1 Data
The data are taken from the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS), produced by Statistics
South Africa under International Labour Organisation guidelines. A nationally representative
sample of approximately 30,000 households is surveyed every September, with a 20% sample re-
placement rate per wave. Supplementary labour-related data are gathered annually in March.
Although the survey has been conducted since 2000, migrant data collection began only in
September 2002, and an entirely new sample was surveyed in 2004. The survey yields standard
demographic and household characteristic data, and rich information on individuals’ labour sit-
uations. It is not, however, a detailed income and expenditure survey, and information on these
aspects is very limited. Analysis in this section is conducted using the most recent available LFS
containing the necessary data—of 85,663 black individuals in 21,847 households, surveyed in
September 2004.15
15Subsequent full LFS surveys omit a crucial household information section, and migrant data.
16The only direct question on OAP status in the LFS asks if one or more household mem-
bers receive the OAP. To the extent that the pension’s effects differ by recipient gender, and
by the number of pension recipients, this neglects potentially valuable information. I therefore
interact the survey variable capturing the presence of at least one recipient with the number of
age-eligible men and age-eligible women in the household, to create indicators for the number
of male and female recipients. The interaction ensures that households with age-eligible indi-
viduals but no recipients (perhaps because the prospective pensioners are amongst the very few
who exceed the pension’s income-eligibility threshold) are not wrongly recorded as receiving
the pension. But the interaction does assume that, conditional on the household reporting OAP
receipt, all age-eligible people in the household are in fact recipients; the features of the OAP
described in Section 1.2.2 justify this approach.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of the OAP. 21% of households report the pres-
ence of one or more OAP recipients. In 2004, a single recipient’s monthly OAP income at the
payout maximum (740 rand) exceeded median monthly household expenditure (approximately
600 rand), suggesting that a household containing two recipients was more than twice as well
off as the median black household, ceteris paribus. It is not surprising, therefore, that 85% of
pension-receiving households describe “pensions and grants” as their most important income
source; other government grants account for very little of this—only 36% of pension-receiving
householdsalsoreceiveothergrants,andfarfewerhouseholdsreceivingonlynon-pensiongrants
report that this is their main income source (39%).16
Figure 2 uses available expenditure data to compare the proportions of recipient and non-
recipient households in eight monthly expenditure categories. All else equal, and assuming that
pension income is counted as household expenditure, over 60% of pension-receiving households
would be in the bottom expenditure category were it not for the pension, compared to just
over 30% of non-recipient households.17 Since pension-receiving households are larger on aver-
age (see Table 1), this understates individual poverty in these households. In accordance with
estimates of the OAP’s value to households using more detailed income and expenditure data
(Case and Deaton 1998, Burns et al. 2005), the OAP appears to rescue a considerable portion of
recipient households from extreme poverty (by any sensible deﬁnition, but here deﬁned rather
loosely as being in the lowest of eight household expenditure categories). However, a signiﬁcant
number of recipient households clearly have access to other income.
Table 1 displays household-level descriptive statistics, by reported OAP status and gender-
speciﬁc age-eligibility.18 The household unit is self-identiﬁed by survey respondents, and only
resident family members are included (deﬁned as those physically present in the place of resi-
dence for at least four nights a week on average, during the preceding month).
16Nor is this because many pension-receiving households contain no working age adults (so-called “hollow”
households (Deaton 1997)). OAP households are larger than average (see Table 1), and the number falls only to
80% for households with at least two 16–50 year olds.
17Since the value of the pension is well over 400 rand (740 rand in 2004), the 13% of OAP households which
report spending less than 400 rand per month must be misreporting expenditure, saving a considerable portion of
their pension income (unlikely at such low expenditure levels), or transferring income to non-residents.
18Reported pension receipt by households containing no age eligible individuals is either the result of survey
error, or captures households which evade the age criterion. Note that, while the OAP status categories displayed
are designed to be exhaustive for completeness, discussion focuses on non-OAP households without age-eligible
members, and OAP households with age-eligible members (which are the subject of regression analysis to follow).
17Households in all recipient categories are bigger than non-recipient households, but the dif-
ference is most pronounced when pension recipients are women. This is attributable not only
to the presence of pensioners themselves, but to higher numbers of individuals in all categories
examined, with the exception of women aged 25–50 (markedly fewer where there are multiple
pensioners). Asset and wealth indicators, while rough due to data constraints, do not suggest
that recipient households are systematically worse off than non-recipients; the former are about
as likely to report some form of savings, and more likely to own their homes. Recipient house-
holds’ educational attainments, measured by the highest level of education obtained by anyone
in the household, are marginally lower than those of non-recipients on average (approximately
a half to a full year less). The 2004 LFS does not provide a clear indicator of rural or urban
location, but only 6% of pension-receiving households live in one of South Africa’s six major
metropolitan areas, compared to 15% of non-receiving households (not shown).
Labour market-related variables paint a dreary picture for recipient households. Despite
their larger overall size, they host somewhat fewer labour market participants, considerably
fewer employed individuals, and more unemployed individuals. This pattern is reinforced by
total household earnings and weekly hours worked, the means of which are both signiﬁcantly
lower in recipient households.
Because the deﬁnition of the household in the LFS is based on residence, migrants are ex-
cluded from the above ﬁgures. It is tempting to interpret non-residence a signal of weak family
ties, and therefore grounds for exclusion. But, as pointed out in Section 2, this would likely
be misleading (Posel et al. 2006). Migrants frequently play an integral role in the economic life
households—the pattern of circular employment migration set up during Apartheid remains
in place (Posel 2001), many migrants’ nuclear families (partners and children) are present, and
remittance ﬂows from migrants are substantial relative to household expenditure (for example,
16% of households describe remittances as their main income source). In South Africa, mi-
grants may not be part of the locationally-deﬁned household, but they are typically very much
part of the family. Table 2 therefore introduces migrant characteristics, and revisits a number of
statistics (as far as the data allow) presented in Table 1, adjusted to include migrants.
24% of households count one or more non-resident migrants as members. Recipient house-
holds, particularly those with female pensioners, contain more migrants, and the probability
that a recipient household contains migrants is 33%, compared to 21% for a non-recipient house-
hold. Migrant age data are unavailable, but if migrants are likely to be aged 25 to 50, then the
dip in this age group observed in Table 1 is eliminated for pension-receiving households; this is
plausible—according to Posel (2001), over 70% of migrants are in this age range.19
With the inclusion of migrants, the number of labour force participants in recipient and
non-recipient households appears similar. The number of employed individuals remains lower,
but only marginally (rather than around half a standard deviation below that of non-recipients,
as before). These contrasts are suggestive evidence in support of Posel et al.’s (2006) claim
that migration is an important aspect in which recipient households differ from non-recipients.
Speciﬁcally, the increased number of migrants in recipient households provides a compelling
explanation for the otherwise opaque decline in 25–50 year-old resident women (and less than
proportional number of resident men of this age) in recipient households. If this interpretation
is correct, ignoring migrant labour would cloud estimates of the OAP’s labour effects.
19See especially Table 5 of Posel (2001). Posel’s (2001) data pre-date those used here by 5 years, but it is reassuring
to note that 1993 ﬁgures, also in Posel (2001), are very similar, suggesting that the age proﬁle of migrants has been
relatively stable in recent years.
18Household size differences prevent easy comparisons of the raw numbers presented thus far.
To address this, Table 2 concludes with selected variables in proportions. Since the focus in the
analysis to come is on individuals aged 19 to 50, labour force participation, employment and
unemployment rates are calculated for individuals in this cohort. The number of migrants is
expressed as a proportion of a wider range—19 to 59 year olds (an assumption, but very likely
a weak one). The results are similar to those described above. Lower resident labour force
participation and employment, and higher unemployment, are not artifacts of household size
differences. Mirroring the raw ﬁgures, households with (especially female) pensioners have a
higher proportion of migrants. If these are included amongst labour force participants and the
employed, the gap in labour force participation between recipient and non-recipients is almost
eliminated, while employment remains lower in recipient households, but less so.
4.3 Regression Analysis: Individuals
4.3.1 Sample Examined
I deﬁne the “prime-age” potential workers under consideration as individuals aged nineteen to
ﬁfty. Nineteen is chosen as the lower bound because the vast majority of adolescents have com-
pleted their schooling by this age. The terminology follows Bertrand et al. (2003) who, however,
deﬁne prime-age as 16 to 50. Legal minimum working age is 15, but most learners complete, or
aim to complete, secondary education (typically at 17 or 18). Further, the determinants of
school-aged adolescents’ school to labour market transitions are likely to be different to those of
adults who have permanently left school, child market labour is not a quantitatively important
feature of the labour market, and drop-out rates are relatively low. Fifty is a rather restrictive up-
per age cut-off, but I follow Bertrand et al. (2003) in wishing to ensure that results do not reﬂect
direct retirement anticipation effects. The prime-age cohort comprises 84% of broadly-deﬁned
labour force participants.
Pooled regressions are followed by separate regressions for prime-age men and women, to
isolate any systematic differences in OAP and other effects by gender which pooling would
obscure.
4.3.2 Outcomes Examined
The LFS provides information on a number of individual labour market outcomes:
- whether or not the individual is a labour market participant, under both the narrow and
broad deﬁnitions;
- if participating, whether the individual is employed (provides any kind of paid work), or
unemployed (under the narrow and broad deﬁnitions, with details on whether there is active
job search);
- if participating and employed, the individual’s working arrangements, and labour supply
(hours worked).
As discussed in Section 3, access to pension income might affect all of these. Examination of
hours worked, however, is complicated by data constraints. Data on migrants are more limited
than that on resident workers, and in particular there is no information on hours worked. This
is understandable since, by deﬁnition, migrants are typically not present to answer survey ques-
tions, and measurement error from secondary reporting would be a real concern even if data
capture were more comprehensive. The survey does, however, identify migrants by asking “are
19there members of this household who are considered migrant workers [emphasis added]?”. It is
thus certainly safe to consider migrants, as deﬁned by the LFS, to be labour participants. Rely-
ing more heavily on the use of the term “worker”, it is also reasonable to assume that migrants
are employed. Binary indicators of participation and employment are therefore the most appeal-
ing measures of labour outcomes from the point of view of incorporating migrants. Examining
labour participation provides an initial indication of whether the OAP has labour incentive ef-
fects. It is employment probability, however, which goes to the heart of the debate over the
OAP’s possible labour effects given the theoretical discussion of Section 3.
In principle, we might model individuals’ labour outcomes as the result of a sequential pro-
cess: ﬁrst, the individual decides whether to participate in the labour market; second, condi-
tional on participation, market employment is either obtained or not. However, in a high in-
voluntary unemployment context, it is not clear that participation and job search incentives are
neatly separable. Consequently, it is hard to think of exclusion restrictions that could be applied
toteaseoutdistinctpartialcorrelationsbetweenvariablesofinterest, andparticipationand(con-
ditional) employment. One candidate is household composition. For example, young children
might discourage adults with a comparative advantage in dependent care from participating, but
not affect the employment probability of adults who do seek to provide market labour. But
(amongst other possibilities) search intensity—and hence conditional employment—might well
be affected, invalidating this approach. Given the sensitivity of sample selection models to spec-
iﬁcation, their use is arguably only compelling if the selection issue is both likely to be strong,
and amenable to identiﬁcation in the data; neither of these conditions is met here.
Consequently, I adopt a straightforward, two-pronged approach, examining indicators of
labour participation (1 if participating, 0 otherwise) and unconditional employment (1 if em-
ployed, 0 otherwise), by probit regression.
4.3.3 Covariates
It is standard to think of three levels of labour outcome determinants: individual, household,
and regional. I control for the ﬁrst using age, age squared, gender, and educational attainment
(allowing for discontinuous effects by using dummies for maximum educational attainment,
with less than primary school completion the omitted category).20
The second—household-level characteristics—may determine individuals’ access to labour
market information networks, the opportunity cost of market labour (through, for example,
the care needs of dependents), and the availability of other income through the wage or non-
labour income of other household members. I control for these using a number of household
composition variables, based on demographics rather than the labour market status of other
household members to minimise the risk of simultaneity. There are controls for the presence of
children under 5, children 6–15, individuals 16–18, 19–21, 22–24, men 25–50, women 25–50, and
individuals older than 50. The number of individuals in a category is net of the individual under
observation. The ﬁrst ﬁve of these composition controls follow Bertrand et al. (2003), with the
granular controls for people of early working age seeking to account for unsettled labour market
outcomes in early working life. I also control for the number of migrants, taking this (for the
moment) as exogenously determined.
20Aswellascapturingdiscreteincreasesinhumancapitalacquiredthroughformaleducation, thisuseofmilestone
educationalattainmentembedstheassumptionthatasigniﬁcantpartofthereturntoeducationstemsfromitsability-
signalling role (“sheepskin” effects).
20Finally, regional labour outcome determinants are potentially important if, for example, re-
gional involuntary unemployment rates differ. I thus include eight provincial dummy variables
(Gauteng, the interior province producing over a third of GDP, is omitted), a dummy variable
for presence in a major metropolitan area, and (due to concern over the lack of information
on truly rural versus urban status) a dummy variable for household location more than thirty
minutes away from public transport (termed “isolated”). I also include a dummy variable for
non-pension government grants in the household (mostly child support and disability grants).
For analogous reasons to those outlined in Section 1.2.2 for the pension, treating these grants
as exogenous is defensible, and they provide one way of controlling partly for other non-wage
household income.
OAP receipt is captured using the interaction terms described in Section 4.1, to isolate po-
tential differences in pension effects by recipient gender. However, because of the possibility
that these variables mistakenly capture non-recipients, and since 8% of households which re-
port receiving the OAP contain no age-eligible individuals, a simple dummy for OAP receipt is
retained as a benchmark.
While the OAP can plausibly be considered exogenous, instrumental variables would be
useful to address lurking endogeneity problems, including endogenous take-up, or endogenous
means-test eligibility (Bertrand et al. 2003, Sahn and Alderman 1996). For example, elderly
household members might be more likely to draw their pensions if working age relatives are
out of work; or, if households with pre-existing characteristics resulting in poor labour market
outcomes capture a disproportionate share of the pension, and these are inadequately controlled
for, estimates of the OAP’s effects would be biased downwards.
The obvious factor correlated with household OAP receipt but less likely to be correlated
with such unobserved factors (themselves correlated with labour outcomes), and that employed
in the existing literature on the OAP (Bertrand et al. 2003, Posel et al. 2006), is the number of
age-eligible individuals in the household. Figure 3 demonstrates the close link between reported
OAP receipt and age. Enforcement of the pension’s age requirement is clearly real but imperfect.
For households in which the oldest member is a 59 year-old woman, the take-up rate is 11%.
This rockets to 70% for households whose oldest member is a 60 year-old woman (who has
just crossed the age eligibility threshold), rising to 88% for households whose oldest member, if
female, is 5 or more years past eligibility age. Male pension age enforcement appears less rigid,
partly reﬂecting households with age-ineligible men whose younger, age-eligible spouses receive
the OAP.
A plausible way to instrument the OAP is thus to use:
- the number of age-eligible women (60 and above);
- the number of age-eligible men (65 and above);
- the number of women aged 55–59;
- the number of men aged 60–64,
where the last two categories capture the correlation between OAP receipt and “cheating” age-
ineligible recipients, and introduce more variation in predicted OAP. One potential source of
endogeneity (an omitted variable problem) which these IVs cannot address is the possibility that
the presence of elderly people in the household affects the labour market outcomes of younger
household members in ways other than the inﬂuence of their pensions. This is addressed in
Section 5.
214.3.4 Results: Labour Force Participation
Table 3, panel 1, reports results. Inthe pooled (acrossprime-age gender)speciﬁcation ofColumn
1, OAP receipt is negatively associated with participation, and statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Instrumenting for pension receipt using an IV Probit (Column 2), the result is very
similar; there is little sign that OAP receipt is endogenous. In the probit on pooled labour
participationwithmaleandfemaleOAPinteractionterms(Column3), thepresenceofmaleand
female pensioners are both negatively associated with labour participation, but female pensioner
presence has a larger coefﬁcient magnitude than male presence, and is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level compared to 5% for male pensioners. Disaggregating by gender (Columns 4 and
5) suggests a strongly signiﬁcant, negative association between female pensioners and the labour
participation of both men and women, but male pension receipt is signiﬁcant only in female
labour supply. The magnitudes of marginal effects at the mean, ranging from 0 to 5%, are
modest.
Other aspects of the regressions generally conform to conventional priors for the determi-
nants of labour participation. Participation rises with age, but at a decreasing rate. Completed
primary, secondary and tertiary education are all positively and signiﬁcantly related to labour
force participation. Married men (women) are more (less) likely to be participants. The pres-
ence of children under ﬁve raises slightly the likelihood of participation (though magnitude is
very small). Older children under 16 have little association with participation. Other household
composition variables are more difﬁcult to interpret directly, but aim to control for the oppor-
tunity cost of market labour, and the potential presence of dependents or other wage earners.
Migrants reduce the likelihood of labour participation for both men and women (with
strong statistical signiﬁcance [1% level], but small mean marginal effects). Explanations in-
clude the possibility that migrants contribute materially to the household (reducing the need
for work), or that they tend to be the members most disposed to participate, reducing the prob-
ability of participation for remaining residents (a selection effect). The signiﬁcance of many
of the province dummies points to the importance of location in determining market labour
participation. Part of the substantial, negative association between “other” (non-OAP) govern-
ment grants and participation is likely the result of this variable capturing the effect of disability
through the state disability grant, and hence should not be interpreted as a pure grant income
effect.21
4.3.5 Results: Employment
Panel 2 of Table 3 displays the results of employment regressions. Being in an OAP household
reducesemploymentprobability,butOAPinteractiontermssuggestthatthisisdrivenprimarily
by female OAP recipients. Magnitudes are substantial—in the pooled speciﬁcation, the pension
is associated with an 11% lower probability of employment, all else equal.
Employment probability rises with age, at a decreasing rate. The importance of education
varies considerably by attainment level; higher education has the largest t-statistic and (posi-
tive) marginal effect of any regressor, while primary education is insigniﬁcant. Young children
are positively related to the probability of male employment, and negatively related to that of
21The survey does not capture disability. Because this is an obviously important determinant of participation, I
therefore include “other grants” as a control despite the fact that this probably conﬂates income and disability effects.
Disability grant take-up has increased signiﬁcantly in recent years, in part because of rising HIV/AIDS prevalence
amongst the working age population (Nattrass 2003).
22women. The more adult household members (across almost all categories) present in the house-
hold,theloweristheprobabilityofemployment. Thismightreﬂectadeclineintheopportunity
cost of leisure with other household wage income, or arise from the fact that larger households
are more likely to be disadvantaged in the labour market in ways not captured by the other re-
gressors. Employment probability also declines with the number of migrants. Being “isolated”
from public transport has a positive assocation with employment. While this seems counter-
intuitive, one explanation is that this captures above average employment amongst households
that provide commercial farm labour.
4.4 Regression Analysis: Households
4.4.1 Motivation
...drawing a sharp line around a group of individuals and calling them a household
does not make it so. There will be a variety of different kinds of ties within the house-
hold, and a variety of overlapping ties between individuals who are labelled in different
households. Making sense of this is our challenge. (Bardhan and Udry 1999)
They consider their real home as where they are coming from. – Anonymous woman,
Limpopo Province, referring to migrants. (Mturi et al. 2005)
Migration, household size, and household composition differences between pension receiving
and non-receiving households are marked in the descriptive statistics of Section 4.2. In the re-
gressions discussed above, these have been controlled for, but taken as exogenous determinants
of labour outcomes. As outlined in Section 2, however, household composition and size may ac-
tively respond to pension income. In the survey, migrants are essentially treated as peripheral to
households deﬁned as groups of family members living in a single residence. Consequently, in-
dividual labour outcomes investigated in Table 3 are resident outcomes, partly dependent upon
locationally-deﬁned household characteristics and the number of migrants. But if non-residents
are considered a part of the family, then treating their labour outcomes as ﬁxed and evaluat-
ing only resident labour outcomes is rather uninformative (and, worse, potentially misleading).
This is Posel et al.’s (2006) critique of Bertrand et al. (2003), at that time the only published paper
addressing directly the OAP’s labour supply effects.
Unfortunately, only limited information on migrants is provided by the LFS. Since there are
nodataonanumberofcontrolsusedinthespeciﬁcationsofSection4.3,thesecannotstraightfor-
wardly be modiﬁed to include migrants by replacing the locational deﬁnition of the household
with an extended one including non-residents (as Posel et al. (2006) do using their 1993 data).
The only way to address the possibility of migrant labour responses to the OAP using the LFS
is to move to a household-level analysis, adding migrants to measures of aggregate, household
labour supply.
Household-level analysis has other attractions. Section 3 describes how the impact of the
OAP on prime-age labour outcomes pre-supposes intrahousehold resource sharing, which may
affect various subsets of working age individuals differently (for example, along gender or age
lines). The individual level regressions performed above control for these factors, but there
is a sense in which the effect of an income transfer on overall household labour supply and
outcomes is an independently interesting question: how does household labour supply respond
to an income transfer to elderly household members? A ﬁnal, pragmatic, reason for shifting to
23the household level is that the LFS has panel data potential, but only at the household level. The
framework developed here thus also serves as a basis for Section 6, which exploits time variation
for identiﬁcation.
4.4.2 Methodology
Household-level speciﬁcations are ﬁrst used to investigate whether the association between the
OAP and migration displayed in the descriptive statistics of Table 2 is robust to the inclusion
of other correlates. They show that it is. To determine the implication of this for the asso-
ciation between the OAP and household labour outcomes, household-level regressions under
strict (resident-only) and expanded (residents and migrants) deﬁnitions of the household are
compared. The same sequence of regression speciﬁcations (pooled, instrumental variable, and
gender-disaggregated OAP measures) is used as in the individual regressions discussed above.
4.4.3 Outcomes examined
Household-level labour outcomes are nothing but aggregations of their constituent individuals’
outcomes. I therefore remain faithful to the two measures of labour outcomes used thus far,
labour force participation and employment. However, unlike at the individual level (where
they take on binary values), these take on integer values at the household level. One way to
deal with this is to retain the binary ﬂavour of the individual level estimations by concentrating
on minima (for example, the probability of at least one individual being employed). But this
discards too much information. Instead, I express labour force participation, employment and
migration as proportions:22
prime-age household labour participation =
participants (19–50)
residents (19–50)
prime-age household employment =
employed individuals (19–50)
residents (19–50)




Aggregation to the household level entails the loss of one level of information in the regressions
ofSection4.3—personalcharacteristics. Iusethehighesteducationalattainmentofanyoneinthe
household (primary, secondary or tertiary), including migrants, to control for the household’s
human capital endowment. I cannot control for age since migrant age is unobserved (but see
Section 5).
The fact that migrant age is unobserved also makes it impossible to use the same set of
household composition controls as in Section 4.3.23 I therefore limit household composition
controls in this section to:
22The appeal of these measures lies in their comparability with individual-level results, and logical expression
of household-level labour outcomes (household participation and employment rates). While bounded dependent
variables are not ideal, results using these speciﬁcations are extremely similar to those using raw numbers (including
ordered probits [not shown]).
23Controls as per Section 4.3 could be used for resident-only speciﬁcations, but doing so would reduce compara-
bility with regressions of migrant-inclusive household labour outcomes.
24- the number of small children (aged 0 to 5);
- the number of older children (aged 6 to 18);
- total household size, including migrants.
Other regressors are as in Section 4.3.
4.4.5 Results: Migration
Table 4 reports results for migration. Positive, signiﬁcant OAP–migrant associations obtain in
the pooled speciﬁcations, and across all speciﬁcations when pensioners are women, but the OAP
is not signiﬁcant when pensioners are men.
In line with expectations that there is a general (though not exclusive, see Posel (2001)) ten-
dency for migration to be a rural to urban phenomenon, location in a metropolitan area is
associated with a reduced proportion of migrants, while location in provinces with the largest
rural populations (especially the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal [KZN]) tends to have the
strongest positive associations with migration. Dependent children, especially younger ones,
are negatively associated with the proportion of adults who are away as migrants. But migration
is increasing in total household size. Secondary school attainment in the household tends to
correlate (weakly) with more migration, likely reﬂecting the superior ability of households with
better educated members to penetrate (especially urban) labour markets. Small coefﬁcient mag-
nitudes, particularly for higher education, likely reﬂect some collinearity with location variables
(better-educated households are likely to be in metropolitan areas and concentrated in provinces
such as Gauteng), as well as a continuing pattern of low-skilled migrant labour (such as miners
and domestic workers).
4.4.6 Results: Participation and Employment
The positive association between migration and the OAP makes it very likely that accounting
for migrant labour when measuring household labour outcomes will affect results materially.
Table 5 compares regressions of household labour force participation when migrants are ex-
cluded (panel 1) and included (panel 2).24
The signs and signiﬁcance of most coefﬁcients are robust to the speciﬁcation of labour par-
ticipation as excluding or including migrants. But there is a signiﬁcant difference for OAP co-
efﬁcient estimates. While the OAP is consistently negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with
labour force participation in the pooled OLS and 2SLS speciﬁcations of both panels, its magni-
tude is reduced universally.
Table 6 compares household-level employment under residential (panel 1) and migrant-
inclusive (panel 2) deﬁnitions of employment.25 The pattern for the OAP is similar to that
of the participation regressions, but more pronounced. The OAP is associated with consid-
erably lower residential household employment – -14% in the pooled OLS speciﬁcation, with
female pension receipt driving most of this (being associated with a 10% lower employment
rate, twice the male pension at -5%). In residential speciﬁcations, furthermore, pension receipt
is statistically signiﬁcant across every gender combination. Total household employment paints
a different picture. The magnitude of the OAP’s employment effect for the pooled sample is
-10% (around 4% weaker), male pension receipt has no statistically signiﬁcant relationship with
24The speciﬁcation of the latter is
(participants (19–50) + migrants)
(residents (19–50) + migrants) .
25The speciﬁcation of the latter is
(employed residents (19–50) + migrants)
(residents (19–50) + migrants) .
25employment under gender-disaggregation, while female pension receipt reduces both male and
female employment, but only a little under half as much as under the residential deﬁnition.
4.4.7 Section Summary
Pension-receiving households are larger overall (though not in terms of working-age residents),
contain less participating and employed residents, and contain more migrants, than their non-
receiving counterparts. At the individual level, considering only residents, I evaluate the OAP’s
effects on the binary choice of broadly-deﬁned labour force participation, and the binary out-
come of employment. The OAP has signiﬁcant, negative associations in most of these speciﬁca-
tions, especially when the pensioner is a woman.
But the individual-level speciﬁcations consider only associations between the pension and
the labour outcomes of resident prime-age family members. Investigating the signiﬁcance of
the pension when its possible effects on the labour outcomes of non-resident family members
are incorporated necessitates a switch to the household-level. Under a residents-only deﬁnition
of household labour participation and employment, these regressions agree broadly with those
at the individual level. Including non-resident labour outcomes, however, signiﬁcantly reduces
the negative association of the pension with both participation and employment (and eliminates
altogether the negative effect of male pension receipt in gender-speciﬁc employment speciﬁca-
tions). Using recent data and a fresh modeling approach, the results of this section thus support
Posel et al.’s (2006) claim that inference about the OAP’s labour market effects is very sensitive
tothewaythehouseholdisdeﬁned. Surveydataconstraintstendtomakearesidentialdeﬁnition
of the household more convenient than a broadly-deﬁned one including non-residents (and the
LFS is no exception). But this exaggerates the negative association between the OAP and labour
supply, because there is a positive relationship between the pension and migration.
However, in contrast to Posel et al.’s (2006) results (based on a restricted sample from 1993
data), generally negative associations between pension receipt, labour participation and (partic-
ularly) employment hold even under an expanded deﬁnition of the household. Interpreting the
ﬁnding that these negative, overall associations coexist with a positive relationship between the
pension and migration is taken up in Section 8.
5 Non-parametric Discontinuity Evidence
The IV speciﬁcations of Section 4 produce OAP estimates that are close to their OLS counter-
parts, strengthening the case that the pension can be considered an exogenous income trans-
fer once observable, systematic differences between pension-receiving and non-receiving house-
holds are controlled for. Nonetheless, analysis in Section 4 suffers from the classic evaluation
problem—the inability to observe pension-receiving households in the absence of the pension.
There are two particularly troubling sources of error.
5.1 The Age Problem
Pension receipt is correlated with the age of the oldest household members, and descriptive
statistics demonstrate that the mean age of recipient households is higher. Consequently, one
concern with the results of Section 4 is the possibility that pension coefﬁcients conﬂate age and
income effects (Bertrand et al. 2003). There are two obvious sources of direct age effects. First,
households with older people may have systematically different age proﬁles, including that of
2619 to 50 year-olds, across which labour outcomes are known to vary. Second, older people may
affect the opportunity cost of work for younger family members by having care needs or (con-
versely) by assisting in the care of other dependents, notably children. If age effects are material,
the numbers of age-eligible (or near age-eligible) household members are not valid instruments
for the pension, and both the OLS and IV-based estimates of Section 4 are inconsistent.
To address the ﬁrst possibility, age (and its square) are controlled for in the individual-level
regressions of Section 4.3. These variables are highly signiﬁcant. But the household-level re-
gressions of Section 4.4 cannot account for the role of age across the spectrum of prime-age
individuals, because migrant ages are unavailable. How signiﬁcant is this omission? The differ-
ence in the mean age of resident 19–50 year-olds in non-OAP and OAP households is under 3
years, but to evaluate whether this masks important distributional differences, Figure 5 displays
kernel estimates of the population age density, by population in and out of OAP households.
Pension-receiving households have relatively fewer individuals aged 18 to 58, and this difference
is quite marked for 40 to 50 year-olds. Part of this difference may be accounted for by the dis-
proportionately higher number of migrants in OAP households, but only if enough migrants
are in the 40–50 age range.
Recipient households, then, appear to have younger working age proﬁles. However, Figure
5 suggests that this is unlikely to generate downward bias in OAP estimates. Plotting predicted
individual labour force participation rates from the pooled regression of Table 3, by age and
OAP status, it displays the lower participation rate predicted throughout the prime-age range
in OAP-receiving households. Figure 5 also displays mean predicted values from a regression
including an ageOAP interaction term. The coefﬁcient on this term is signiﬁcant and neg-
ative (though small in magnitude); the difference in participation is slightly more marked for
relatively older (35 and above) workers in this range (compatible with Bertrand et al.’s (2003)
ﬁnding that the negative labour supply response to the pension is concentrated amongst older
resident workers).26 This suggests that household-level regressions might, if anything, underes-
timate average negative participation effects, if prime-age members of OAP households tend to
be younger. The parametric evidence, then, is that potential workers in OAP households could
well be younger, but there is no indication that this is the source of negative OAP associations
in household-level regressions.27
Addressing the second source of direct age effects entails identifying separately the effect of
thepresenceoftheoldestmembersinthehouseholdandtheeffectofpensionincome. Collinear-
ity between the age of the oldest individuals in the household and pension receipt (driven by the
high take-up rate amongst age-eligible individuals) makes this a challenge.
5.2 The Endogenous Household Formation Problem
Sections 2 and 4 describe how household composition might respond to the pension. Section 4
deals explicitly with one potential such effect, migration. But another—that pension-receiving
households attract non-participating or unemployed members—is not addressed beyond con-
trolling for household size and composition. The general reason for this is that modeling house-
hold formation explicitly using labour force survey data is not feasible. The particular problem
26Interaction term effects are similar in all individual-level regressions (not shown).
27Thisargumentwouldbemisleadingiftherewasreasontobelievethatmigrantstendedtobetowardsthebottom
of the prime-age range (recall that individual-level regressions exclude migrants). To the contrary, however, there is
evidence (albeit not contemporaneous) that migrants tend to be a little older within this age range (Posel 2001).
27for inference on the OAP’s effects is that the age of the oldest household member can be ex-
pected to be a key determinant of household composition (for example, a woman old enough to
be a grandmother is in some sense the “cause” of a three-generation household comprising her
children and children’s children), and this may in turn drive labour outcomes. But, again, the
collinearity of pension receipt with oldest member age makes partialling out this effect prob-
lematic.
5.3 A Solution: Exploiting the Age-Eligibility Discontinuity
Figure 3 shows that the age eligibility rule plays a pivotal role in determining pension receipt.
This discontinuity in the likelihood of receiving the OAP, occuring as men and women cross
their respective age eligibility thresholds, provides an alternative way of examining the pension’s
effects.28 The aim is to assess the importance of a potential age trend effect for previous results
and undertake causal inference of the OAP’s impact.
5.3.1 Methodology
To examine age-of-oldest trends and any OAP-associated discontinuities, it is appealing to im-
pose minimal constraints on the data and observe how they behave around the discontinuity
point, thus avoiding spurious results caused by model misspeciﬁcation. For example, age trend
effects may involve several slope changes (perhaps as the mix of dependent minor ages changes,
or the elderly themselves develop care needs).
Since they base inference on smoothed data close to the age threshold, nonparametric meth-
ods demand a substantial sample size to yield adequate precision. Consequently, I pool waves
to construct the largest possible sample obtainable from the LF surveys (that meets data re-
quirements, notably migrant indicators). This pooled sample comprises the full 2002 and 2004
September LFS waves (which are independently-drawn samples), as well as the refreshed portion
of the 2003 September wave (about 20% of sampled households).
As Figure 3 demonstrates, age is a looser indicator of OAP receipt for men than women.
Since men are older when they qualify formally for the pension, administrators may be more
inclined to bend the rules. Additionally, most men have younger spouses; as women turn 60,
households whose oldest member is male register a switch to OAP status which may look like
poor age-criterion enforcement for men under 65, but actually reﬂects the legitimate take-up
of their age-eligible partners. Consequently, I restrict analysis in this section to the subsample
of households in which the oldest member is a woman is aged 51 to 79, or the oldest man is
under 65. This essentially eliminates any ambiguity over who in the household is responsible
for a switch to pension status, and results in an assessment of the effects of ﬁrst pension receipt
only.29 Of the total, pooled sample, 22% of all households, and 78% of households containing
women over 50, fall into this category. In all, there are 11,142 households, with an average of
398 households at each oldest-woman age. As long as any underlying structural relationships
28Several existing papers adopt variants of this identiﬁcation strategy (see Section 2). Duﬂo (2000) (child develop-
ment outcomes using 1993 data) and Edmonds et al. (2005) (household formation using 1996 census data) are non-
parametric implementations. Ranchhod’s (2006) parametric (IV probit) evaluation of elderly labour supply effects is
similar in spirit to the present method.
29A focus on female pensioners is supported by the results of Section 4, and those in the existing literature, which
tend to suggest that female pension receipt has stronger effects. An upper limit of 79 is chosen to generate the longest
possible OAP-eligible trend it is feasible to examine given sample sizes.
28between the pension and evaluated outcomes are constant over the 2002 to 2004 period, this
pooled sample should support consistent inference.
The causal effect of pension receipt is estimated as the discontinuity in the variable of in-
terest at the take-up threshold, female pension-eligibility age (60). The premise is that in the
absence of the OAP, the age of the oldest woman might impact the variable of interest, but that
it would do so continuously, making any jump away from the trend at 60 attributable to the
pension. Identiﬁcation based on such a discontinuity should in principle be purged of potential
household age proﬁle and age-of-oldest effects (or, indeed, any systematic, unobserved hetero-
geneity that does not happen to also spike at the threshold). Conceptually, this “discontinuity
design” approach is similar to the use of eligibility threshold age as an instrumental variable for
the OAP. We rely on the notion that households nearby, but on opposite sides of, eligibility age
are similar, except for pension status.
Examination is based on local linear regressions using triangle kernels, with bandwidths se-
lected using the rule of thumb (RoT) method offered by Stata 10 (and checked by visual inspec-
tion). OAP impact estimates are local Wald estimates of the ratio of the jumps in the dependent
variable of interest and the probability of receiving the OAP at female pension eligibility age.
Such a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity design is appropriate given that pension take-up is not
predicted perfectly by the age threshold, since it adjusts for less than full assignment to OAP
“treatment” at 60. Estimates’ standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping (with 1000 replica-
tions).30
Finite sample bias is a possible concern given the limited sample at hand. Consequently,
I also consider semi-parametric speciﬁcations. For each observation (i), predicted values (^ yi)
generated from the parametric speciﬁcations of Section 4 are subtracted from actual dependent
outcome values (yi), so that the local linear regression model becomes:
yi   ^ yi = f (oldest female age)+i (15)
where f () is the relevant local linear regression estimate of the oldest-female-age–outcome asso-
ciation, and  is a random error. This implementation, then, considers the relationship of inter-
est for each observation, net of the effect of observable correlates (assumed to enter additively).
This approach corresponds conceptually to that of Section 4.4, with the (“ﬂexible”) addition of a
trend age-of-oldest-member effect (there an omitted variable), and OAP identiﬁcation based on
any trend discontinuity at 60.
5.3.2 Outcomes Examined
A non-parametric approach is well-suited to examining whether labour outcome variables dis-
playage-of-oldesttrendeffects,andwhetherthepensioninduceshouseholdcompositionchanges,
which may impact the integrity of labour effect estimates. Consequently, OAP impacts on over-
all household size (including migrant members), small children (under 6), older children and
adolescents (aged 6 to 18), and prime-age members (19 to 50) are examined. Semi-parametric
models for these outcomes remove household location (provincial, and distance from public
transport), and non-OAP public transfer receipt, partial correlations.
Labour outcomes examined are those of Section 4.4, including migrants: the proportion
30Implementation draws on Imbens and Lemieux (2007) and the “rd” Stata package (Nichols 2007).
29of prime-age members who are migrants, labour participants and employed, disaggregated by
gender.31
5.3.3 Results
Figure 6 illustrates the OAP assignment probability calculation (which generates the Wald esti-
mate denominator). Figures 7 to 10 display smoothed (local linear regression) estimates of fully
non-parametric “age of oldest”–outcome relationships, allowing for a discontinuity at 60, and
using preferred (rule of thumb) bandwidths. For the raw data, see Appendix A (which displays
means and 95% conﬁdence intervals). Coefﬁcient estimates of OAP impacts and their boot-
strapped standard errors are presented in Table 7. Non- and semi-parametric estimates (denoted
NP and SP, respectively) are presented alongside, by the preferred RoT bandwidth, and with
this bandwidth halved and doubled to indicate robustness to the mechanics of the smoothing
process.
Mean household size trends upwards (very weakly) with oldest-female age. Other outcomes
examined display little evidence of consistent trends. There is a slight, though apparently sys-
tematic, decline in the number of young children for households in which the oldest women are
over 70. If anything, we might expect this to liberate care-givers to supply market labour, so this
seems unlikely to be a source of downward bias in other OAP estimates.
The OAP assignment threshold has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on total household
size, the number of older children and adolescents, or the number of prime-age members. There
aremarkeddifferencesinnon-andsemi-parametriccoefﬁcientsformosthouseholdcomposition
measures; a plausible explanation is that provincial location matters both for pension take-up
and mean household size (through location-speciﬁc, cultural family size and living arrangement
norms, and variation in pension administration). But all conventional conﬁdence intervals in-
clude zero. However, there is a robust association between the OAP and more small children (5
and under).
Labour-relatedvariablesalsoshowlittlesensitivitytothediscontinuity. Therearenobandwidth-
and speciﬁcation-robust responses to the OAP threshold, except for the female labour participa-
tion rate, which is consistently, signiﬁcantly reduced across speciﬁcations.
5.4 Discussion
Results do not support the notion that households containing pensioners experience an inﬂux
ofworking-ageindividuals.32 Rather, thereasonrecipienthouseholdstendtobelargerthannon-
recipienthouseholdsismorelikelythattheirageproﬁlesaredifferent—gradual,demographically-
driven change, rather than the OAP. This has positive implications for the integrity of the
speciﬁcations of Section 4, which account for migrant responses, but not the possibility that
individuals predisposed to having poor labour market outcomes select into pension-receiving
households.
Incorporatingmigrantlaboursupply,andincontrasttotheresultsofSection4,discontinuity-
based estimates suggest that the OAP is participation and employment neutral for the overall
sample, withdiscernableeffectsononlyfemaleparticipation. Inspectingtherawdata(Appendix
31Household- rather than individual-level analysis is motivated by the need for migrant-inclusive controls in semi-
parametric evaluations.
32Note that this compares well with the results of Edmonds et al. (2005), using a much larger sample from the
1996 national census, which allows many composition categories to be examined.
30A) suggests that local Wald estimates obtain from a genuine step-change in female participation
at the threshold. However, a number of factors qualify these discontinuity-based results.
Identiﬁcationisbasedonacomparisonofhouseholdsinwhichwomenareclosetoeligibility
age, so estimates cannot necessarily be generalised to households with considerably younger, or
older, oldest female members. That is, the identifying assumption that households on either
side of the threshold are similar may not be compelling for a considerable proportion of total
eligible and ineligible households. Even if external validity along this dimension is adequate,
only the impact of ﬁrst female pension receipt has been examined, using a sample that is not
fullyreﬂectiveoftheultimatepopulationofinterest: allpension-receivinghouseholds,including
those with male-only pensioners.
Pensionreceiptishighlypredictable(householdmembersarelikelytoknowwhenaprospec-
tive recipient will become age-eligible, and recipients are not likely to delay acquiring the pen-
sion once they become age-eligible). This could result in behavioural adjustment prior to age-
eligibility. In addition, households may take time to adjust to pension income, resulting in
signiﬁcant lags before the pension’s effects become visible. Either case will weaken the link be-
tween observed OAP assignment at 60 and effects of interest, compromising discontinuity-based
identiﬁcation. Evidence that households are liquidity constrained (Edmonds 2006) may seem to
mitigate the risk of anticipation effects. But the raw outcome data (Appendix A) is at least sug-
gestive of step-changes in a number of key variables (notably female migration) two to three
years prior to sixty. Since there is no corresponding jump in OAP assignment probability (see
Figure 14) at these ages, this is not likely to reﬂect signiﬁcant age criterion evasion. Anticipation
effects cannot easily be accounted for in a discontinuity framework.
The stochastic nature of observed pension receipt around eligibility age introduces other
risks. If women below eligibility age are able to claim successfully that they are 60 and con-
sequently draw OAP income, then the assumption that recipients and non-recipients are sim-
ilar around the acquisition threshold except for the OAP may be questionable. For example,
households containing women who claim to be 60 may be behaviourally different to those con-
taining women who report that they are 59 (more motivated, inventive, informed, or socially
connected), or more desperate for pension income (perhaps because of inferior ex ante labour
outcomes). The direction of the bias induced by such “manipulation of the forcing variable”
(Imbens and Lemieux 2007) is unclear, a priori. Following Imbens and Lemieux’s (2007) sugges-
tion, Figure 11 plots frequencies of the age of the oldest women in households; a discontinuity
in the density would support a suspicion that there is manipulation (though this is detectable
only if women mis-report their ages to surveyors as well as pension administrators). There is
indeed a spike in the number of women aged 60 compared to surrounding ages. However, there
are similar jumps in the data at 52 and 62, where there is no reason to think that women are
incentivised to misreport their ages. And, to the extent that women in their late 50s are claim-
ing to be 60, this may also merely be due to rounding which, if also affecting pension receipt,
seems unlikely to be associated with a selection problem and, if not affecting pension receipt, is
compensated for by the use of a “fuzzy” discontinuity design that treats assignment probability
at reported ages as imperfect.
Most importantly, the size of the sample is probably at or below the minimum required for
compelling nonparametric inference, particularly since OAP assignment at the age threshold is
imperfect. Using female labour participation as an example, Figure 12 tests for vulnerability to
type1errorsbyimaginingOAPassignmentat55and65; thereisnoindicationthatthisisbehind
the statistically signiﬁcant female labour participation result. Nonetheless, given the limited
31sample size, the data may simply be too noisy for identiﬁcation by non-parametric discontinuity
design. Several outcome variables, notably the employment and participation variables which
are of central interest, appear rather choppy across older women ages (ﬁgures in Appendix A).
The above challenges for discontinuity-based inference using the LFS are severe enough to
signiﬁcantly qualify results. As such, the contribution of these estimates is essentially two-fold.
First, there is no evidence that there are signiﬁcant age-of-oldest trends which may confound
parametric estimates.33 Second, while we cannot be conﬁdent that discontinuity estimates effec-
tively capture holistically the full behavioural effects of the OAP, there is no evidence in the LF
surveys of dramatic prime-age labour supply responses to the oldest women in the household
becoming age-eligible for the OAP.
A ﬁnal source of identiﬁcation using the LF surveys of the pension’s effects—variation across
time—remains, to which I now turn.
6 Longitudinal Evidence
Although designed as a rotating panel, the LF surveys have problems which limit their longitu-
dinal analysis capabilities. Crucially, although household identiﬁer codes are consistent across
waves, individualidentiﬁersarenot. Consequently, apanelcanbeconstructedatonlythehouse-
hold level. While limiting, this is not a fatal ﬂaw since, as described in Section 4, household-level
evaluation is necessary in any case for the incorporation of migrant labour, and evaluating aggre-
gate changes in the labour outcomes of prime-age household members is of direct interest given
that the intervention is mediated through other household members.
Migrant data collection in the LFS began only in 2002, and an entirely new sample was
surveyed in 2004. With preceding analysis having pointed to the fundamental importance of
migrants, this means that just two waves (2002 and 2003), are available.34 Since these waves are
in consecutive years, anticipation effects and incomplete adjustment pose a risk. In particular,
with a maximum of only twelve months (and potentially as little as one month) to adjust to the
pension for a given change in pension status in the data, incomplete adjustment at the time of the
surveyisapossible, seriouslimitation. Nonetheless, paneltechniquesprovideanopportunityto
addtotheevidencefromprevioussections,andprovideﬁrmergroundsforcausalinterpretations
of statistical associations between the pension and variables of interest.
I construct a balanced, household level panel, comprising observations on households in
2002 and 2003, for a total of 12,212 unique households, observed twice. Table 8 displays the
frequency of observations on households by OAP status; OAP gains and losses are common
enough to make time a feasible source of variation.
To maintain comparability with previous results, the same labour outcome measures are
examined: migrant-inclusive household labour force participation and employment.
6.1 Difference in Differences
First-differencing the household-level speciﬁcations of Section 4.4 removes all time-invariant
heterogenity. However, analysis in ﬁrst differences requires some alteration of the regressors
33This claim can be made with some conﬁdence, since it is based on both a non-parametric examination of
bivariate relationships, and a more restrictive semi-parametric implementation with covariate controls (results not
shown, but results are very similar).
34The alternative is to ignore migrants, expanding the set of available waves to three (2001–2003). But this is likely
to paint a misleading picture of the OAP’s effects unless selection into non-migration is very carefully addressed.
32used in Section 4.4’s regressions in levels. One reason for including provincial location is to
capture regional variation in involuntary unemployment. This time-varying factor is nested in
a time-invariant location variable (province). However, changes in local unemployment rates—
stemming, for example, from exogenous changes in labour demand coupled with wage rigidity—
could drive observed variation in household employment rates across time, and are potentially
related to OAP status given regional administration differences. Thus, regressions in ﬁrst dif-
ferences control for the provincial, broad unemployment rate (calculated from the relevant LFS
sample); changes in this rate between 2002 and 2003 range from -2.1% (Gauteng) to 3.2% (North-
ern Cape).
Table 9 reports labour participation and employment regression results. Considering par-
ticipation (panel 1), the OAP has a statistically signiﬁcant, negative effect of 3% on participation
in the aggregate. Disaggregations suggest that male pension receipt is insigniﬁcant, while female
pension receipt is statistically signiﬁcant in (only) male participation (-4%, at the 1% level, all
else equal).
Turning to other variables, provincial unemployment rate changes have signiﬁcant effects on
changes in participation, driven by negative associations with female (but not male) participa-
tion. A change in the number of small children (5 and under) has a modest, negative impact on
labour force participation, while changes in the number older children (6 to 15) have a positive
impact for men (perhaps because ﬁnancial considerations dominate for these children, and not
for younger ones, in the tug of war between needing to earn income to support children and
having sufﬁcient time to look after them). A change in non-pension government grants receipt
affects participation materially negatively (again, this is likely to be caused at least partly by the
labour market withdrawal of disability grant qualiﬁers).
Foremployment(panel2),achangeinpensionreceiptisastatisticallysigniﬁcantcontributor
to a decline in employment in the pooled sample. Male pension receipt, however, is consistently
insigniﬁcant; the effect of the pension in the aggregate is thus in large part a product of the
inﬂuence of female pension receipt. Generalising, then, female pension receipt appears to be a
signiﬁcant driver of prime-age family member labour outcomes, while the male pension does
not, when identiﬁed exclusively by time variation.
Changes in the number of young children affect female employment negatively (in contrast
to no relationship with participation). Women who stop working to care for children may not
consider themselves permanently out of the labour market, so that their reduced employment
is not reﬂected as reduced (broadly-deﬁned) participation in the data. The negative coefﬁcient
on a change in maximum educational attainment in the household is likely to reﬂect high youth
unemployment, as older (19 and above) ﬁrst-time labour force entrants—whose attainment is
typically higher than that of their parents, and who account for the bulk of educational attain-
ment change across the samples—struggle to ﬁnd employment.
6.2 Additional Levels Controls
The above regressions in pure ﬁrst-differences are not able to account for much of the observed
variationinlabouroutcomes(adjustedR-squaredsandjointcovariatesigniﬁcancetestsarepoor).
A richer, alternative speciﬁcation includes controls in levels for systematic differences between








where h is a household, t is a period dummy, x is a vector of time-varying household controls,
z is a vector of state ﬁxed effects, and T is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for 2003
and 0 otherwise (i.e. a year ﬁxed effect). D indicates OAP treatment group membership, taking
on a value of 0 for households which do not report receiving the OAP in either period, and 1
for households which begin receiving OAP income between the 2002 and 2003 surveys. Iden-
tiﬁcation, then, is based on a comparison between non-OAP households, and ﬁrst-time OAP
recipient households (whether pensioners are male or female), in contrast to the more general
time variation (in overall household OAP status, and numbers of male and female recipients,
including losses) exploited by the analysis of Section 6.1. The OAP “treatment” effect is given
by 3.
Regressions of this form are again run for labour force participation and employment. As
these are speciﬁed in levels, it is possible to use the same covariates as in the cross-section regres-
sions of Section 4.4, with the exception of the metro location dummy (which is not available in
these waves). Estimations by OAP recipient gender are not undertaken, given the likely impreci-
sion of results from subdividing a treatment group that is already rather small, both in absolute
terms and relative to the control group (separate regressions are, however, run for working age
men and women).
Table 10 reports the results of labour force participation and employment regressions. OAP
treatment has no statistically signiﬁcant bearing on the proportion of labour force participants,
but does reduce the proportion of prime-age household members (including migrants) who are
employed. Prime-age gender-disaggregation indicates the magnitude of the effect for women is
large (-11%), while the coefﬁcient on male employment narrowly misses statistical signiﬁcance
at the conventional, 10% cut-off (its p-value is 0.13).
6.3 Discussion
With only two waves available, the amount of variation across time in the data is clearly lim-
ited. Anticipation effects can be ruled out only if households are myopic, forward-looking but
nonetheless ﬁnd it optimal not to alter behaviour before pension receipt, or severely liquidity-
constrained. In the discontinuity analysis (Section 5), there are some indications of anticipation
effects, but identiﬁcation in the present section is based on switches in actual OAP status (not
discontinuities at eligibility age) and so may not be similarly affected. Incomplete adjustment
is perhaps more difﬁcult to dismiss, particularly if liquidity constraints make anticipatory ad-
justment impossible. This may be particularly true of migrant labour—relocation is costly and
complicated, and prospective migrants may need more time to make arrangements to depart
in response to pension income than is observed in consecutive, annual surveys. It is also pos-
sible that prospective migrants temporarily drop out of employment (though not necessarily
self-reported labour force participation) in order to relocate. If this were the case, incomplete
adjustment would bias the estimated, employment effect downwards.
An additional concern is the parallel trend assumption underpinning estimation. This as-
sumption is at its most convincing when the treatment and control groups are quite similar
prior to treatment (Ravallion 2005). The extent to which this is true in the current case is ques-
tionable; while comparative descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups are not
34shown, previous descriptive statistics (Table 1), suggest that recipient households are different to
non-recipients in some aspects.
More generally, Kingdon and Knight (2005) note that South African “labour market data
display some inexplicable large ﬂuctuations” (p.2) across years, and suggest that caution needs to
be exercised in making “categorical statements about labour market changes over time” (ibid.).
The differencing approach used here, however, ought to address concerns about idiosyncratic
differences between LFS waves, if it is accepted that these are likely to affect readings for all
households (OAP recipient or not) in the same way.
The contribution of the longitudinal analysis, then, is brieﬂy as follows: the signiﬁcant OAP
associations found in Section 4 do not have intrinsic causal interpretations, and may arise from
unaccounted-for heterogeneity correlated with both pension receipt and labour outcomes. Sec-
tion 5 seeks to identify pension effects using eligibility threshold discontinuities, and is par-
ticularly useful for examining the role of any age trends, but has major limitations for causal
inference of average OAP effects. By removing time-invariant heterogeneity, differencing con-
tributes by providing a strong case for causality from the OAP to outcomes of interest. Caveats,
however, include anticipation and incomplete adjustment effects, and the validity of the parallel
trend assumption. Nevertheless, results bolster those in Section 4, suggesting that there are tan-
gible, negative labour supply responses to the pension on average, concentrated in employment
probability.
7 Gender
Gender, as noted in Section 2, is a central theme of the OAP literature. In particular, pensions
drawn by women are often found to have larger effects than those received by men. Household
expenditureallocationsdifferaccordingtowhetherresidentpensionersaremenorwomen(Case
and Deaton 1998); grandmothers’ pensions boost child development indicators much more sig-
niﬁcantly than grandfathers’ (Duﬂo 2000); female pension receipt reduces prime-age labour sup-
ply more than male (Bertrand et al. 2003); positive associations between migration and pension
income are most pronounced when pensioners are female (Posel et al. 2006). The empirical
results presented above are no exception to the pattern. This section examines why.
7.1 More Female Pensioners?
Households are much more likely to receive the pension through an age-eligible woman than
a man. The ﬁrst reason for this is programme design. Women become eligible for the pension
5 years earlier than men so, with age enforcement, female pensions account for all pensions in
households whose oldest member is younger than 65 (25% of all pension-receiving households).
The second (and most important) reason is demography. Women’s life expectancies are higher
than men’s, so as households age, fewer households contain elderly men. Men comprise 56%
of the oldest members of households whose oldest member is under 55, dropping to 48% for
households whose oldest member is 55 to 65 years old, and 33% for households with 70 year-
olds or above. The combination of the lower female age threshold, and diverging mortality
rates by gender, means that 80% of pension-receiving households contain age-eligible females,
compared to 29% containing age-eligible males.35
35All ﬁgures from the 2004 LFS.
35In consequence, estimator precision is likely to be higher for female pensions than male,
since there are more observations of the former. While this will tend to increase the standard
errors of male pension coefﬁcients, it will not alter point estimates. Since male point estimates
are consistently smaller than female pension estimates, this cannot be the dominant cause of the
gender differential, which is as much about coefﬁcient magnitude as statistical signiﬁcance.
Another consequence, however, is that women account for ﬁrst-time pension receipt far
more than men. Of the 569 switches to OAP receipt observed in the LFS panel constructed
for Section 6, 63% are associated with women becoming age-eligible, and 23% with men be-
coming age-eligible. If pension income has diminishing marginal effects, ﬁrst pension receipt
will have a bigger inﬂuence than subsequent additions in pension income, and much of this
is associated with women. Relatedly, women are more likely to to be the sole pension recip-
ients in households than men, again reducing the impact of male pension receipt if there are
diminishing marginal effects. I evaluate the importance of this possible cause of weaker male
pension signiﬁcance informally by re-running the regressions of Sections 4 and 6 on a restricted
sample excluding households with age-eligible females (not shown). These do indeed tend to re-
port stronger male pension signiﬁcance, but signiﬁcance in terms of conventional level cut-offs
remains qualitatively similar to displayed results.
7.2 Altruism and Bargaining Power Differences
The fact that gender matters is a blow to the plausibility of the unitary model of household
decision-making for pension-receiving households because that model predicts perfect income
pooling. To take a particularly pertinent case, the ﬁnding of signiﬁcantly different coefﬁcients
on pension income by gender in estimations of individual participation by Bertrand et al. (2003)
can be interpreted as a rejection of the conditions for optimal labour supply under an aggregate,
household utility function (outlined in Section 3.2.1). The signiﬁcance of gender has thus led to
a consensus in the empirical OAP literature that the unitary household model does not describe
pension-receiving households.
Section 3.3 also describes how, in collective household-decision models, pensioner charac-
teristics could drive the pension’s effects, through differences in , the sharing rule. Gender is
highlighted as a potential source of variation in sharing rules. A natural interpretation of the
empiricalﬁndingofgender-differentiatedpensioneffectsisthereforethatsomekindofcollective
decision-making model (not the unitary model) is appropriate, and that differences in altruism
or bargaining power between male and female pensioners are at work. This is ﬁrmly in line with
the broader consensus that the unitary model is a frequently inapplicable model of household
decision-making, and that cash transfers tagged to women tend to be more fungible, and spent
in more “desirable” ways.36
7.3 The Annuity Value of the Pension
Thestandardhouseholddecision-makingtheoriesreviewedbrieﬂyinSection3arestatic—labour
supply decisions are made on a period-by-period basis. While this is a straightforward and illu-
minating way to model labour supply, it ignores the possibility that individuals and households
plan ahead; if pension-receiving households optimise within a time period, why should they not
optimise across time too?
36This is an inﬂuential view. See, for example, Department for International Development (2005).
36Forward-looking behaviour with respect to the pension introduces a difference between
male and female pension receipt that has not been considered by the literature. Men and women
receive the same monthly pension payments, P. But the total stream of pension income that
men and women can expect on average—
PT
t=1Pt, where t is a time period—is different. The
typicalwomanbeginsreceivingthepension5yearsearlierthanthetypicalman, andliveslonger.
These factors have been noted as explanations for the fact that there are more female than male
pensioners, but they also mean that if the pension is thought of as an annuity (a stream of ﬁxed
payments over a period of time), the average total value of the female pension is higher than the
male pension.
How much higher? Figure 13, a population pyramid by gender for the population over 50 in
the2004LFS,demonstratestherelationshipbetweengenderandageing. Survivalratedifferences
are clearly substantial, with more women in all pensionable age categories. Best mortality rate
estimates, basedonthemostrecent(2001)NationalCensus, indicatethatblacklifeexpectancyat
60 is 15 years for men and 18 years for women.37 This implies that, at their respective eligibility
ages, female pensioners can expect to receive the OAP for 18 years, and males for 10 years.
The consequences of this expected duration difference for the expected present value of lifetime











where r is the discount rate and T the number of time periods. Using the above duration
expectancies, abstracting from inﬂation and changes in the real value of the pension (P =740
12, its annualised monthly value in 2004, the key year of analysis), and using a discount rate of
7%, the approximate expected present value of the pension is 62,400 rand for men and 89,300
rand for women.38 The calculation is rough (treating real pension value as certain and ﬁxed
across time, using the real interest rate to measure subjective time discounting, and substituting
E(T) for T), but illustrates the magnitude of the 44% difference in rand terms.
If individuals and households adopt a multiple-period approach to optimal labour supply
choice, this could have signiﬁcant consequences for the predicted effect of the pension. For an
illustrative example39, assume temporally separable utility (so that total utility is the aggregation
across time of independent instantaneous utilities), and the ability to smooth consumption over
time by saving at constant interest rate, r. Following the consensus view in the literature that
a collective household decision-making model is appropriate, revert to the simple model of Sec-
tion 3.3, with a household comprising a prime-age individual y and pensioner a. Across t time
periods spanning periods 1 to T, y’s intertemporal optimisation problem is:40
37Estimates provided by Professor Rob Dorrington of the Centre for Actuarial Research, University of Cape
Town. See also Dorrington, Moultrie and Timæus (2004).
38The discount rate is a conservative estimate based on the nominal prime lending rate (10.5%) less the consumer
price inﬂation rate (3.9%) in 2004.
39Following Cahuc and Zylberberg’s (2001) exposition of intertemporal labour choice.



















The RHS of the above “global” budget constraint is the discounted present value of all income
across time, including y—y’s share of pension income. It is a standard result that, if leisure
is a normal good, lifetime labour supply declines with a rise in lifetime wealth, a component
of which is pension income. Speciﬁcally for our purposes, optimal labour supply will respond















(the lifetime equivalent of P =ty +ta from Section 3.3). But the annuity calculation above
has shown that this is higher on average for the female pension than the male. Thus, for exactly
the same sharing rule over male and female pension income, the higher annuity value of the
female pension will generate larger labour supply effects than the male pension.
An analogous exposition would demonstrate the possibility of gender-differentiated pension
effects in a unitary household model. That is, such effects could also arise from maximisation of
an aggregate household utility function, resulting in perfect income pooling, when households
are forward-looking with respect to pension income and labour supply decisions.
Annuityvaluedifferencesmightalsoliebehinddifferentiatedretainedincomeandjobsearch
impacts when these are forward-looking.
7.4 Section Summary
The ﬁnding that male and female pension effects are different has strong implications if it is
accepted that it does not arise for purely econometric reasons (in the sense that inference about
the male pension is clouded by the more pervasive presence of the female pension in the data).
Speciﬁcally, the result has been interpreted as supportive of collective decision-making models
in which sharing rules differ by gender. This section suggests an alternative. It is plausible
that households are forward-looking, and that there is (rough) knowledge about life expectancy.
Given this, the simple intertemporal analogues of static individual and household labour supply
optimisation models provide a prima facie reason to expect different pension effects by recipient
gender, without recourse to differences in sharing rules, or even the need to reject the unitary
household model.
Of course, the extent of forward-lookingness in the context of poverty, liquidity constraints
and uncertainty is open to debate. Doubts about the applicability of the unitary household-
model are now near-universal, and the collective approach to modeling household decision-
making is evidently a fruitful one. In this context, there are good reasons to think that bar-
gaining power (and possibly altruism) does vary by gender, both generally and with speciﬁc
38respect to OAP households.41 Perhaps most importantly, the above discussion addresses only
the different effects of the pension by recipient gender, when different effects by the gender of
the ultimate subjects of interest—prime-age individuals—are also found. These may also arise for
reasons unrelated to the determination of , but do not provide any support for the notion that
the key factor driving gender effects is the difference in the pension’s annuity value.
All of this said, the fact that the expected annuity value of the pension differs by around
44% by recipient gender is striking. This qualiﬁes the literature’s interpretation of gender-
differentiated OAP effects as constituting an unequivocal rejection of the income pooling hy-
pothesis.
8 Conclusions
The recipients of these grants end up supporting far more people than the grants were
intended for. – Social Development Minister Zola Skweyiya (on pensions and other
state welfare grants), September 2005
More welfare grants would cause some to stop working ...and so? – Article headline,
Business Day newspaper, February 2006
Viewed as an old-age support cash transfer, the OAP has signiﬁcant unintended consequences.
In particular, this paper ﬁnds that it is associated with statistically signiﬁcant declines in labour
force participation and employment probabilities, amongst prime-age individuals in pension-
receiving households. These effects are much larger and more robust for employment than
broadly-deﬁned participation, and occur mainly when pension recipients are women. Migra-
tion probability, on the other hand, is positively affected by the pension. In general, the labour
outcomes of both prime-age men and women are responsive, but the magnitudes of these co-
efﬁcients are not fully consistent across speciﬁcations (that is, while female pension receipt is
unambiguously more important than male receipt, a similarly clear pattern about the distribu-
tion of pension effects by the gender of prime-age household members does not emerge). How
should these ﬁndings be interpreted? What do they imply?
8.1 The Household
8.1.1 Household Decision-Making
The most basic observation is that pension income affects the outcomes of non-recipients. This
accords with strong, existing economic and sociological evidence of pension-sharing in South
Africa, and with the general prior that resources are shared within households. The respon-
siveness of non-targeted household members to cash transfers makes it clear that understanding
intrahousehold resource allocation is vital if the consequences and efﬁcacy of policy (especially
the “who beneﬁts?” question) are to be evaluated holistically in South Africa.
Gender-differentiated pension effects have been interpreted as a rejection of unitary house-
hold decision-making, instead indicating that collective decision-making with gender differences
in altruism or bargaining power is the appropriate paradigm. Section 7 casts some doubt on the
41It seems unlikely, for example, that the disproportionately strong effect of female pension income on child de-
velopment outcomes found by Duﬂo (2000) arises solely from households’ smoothing of female versus male annuity
income.
39use of gender-differentiated labour supply responses to the pension to make this argument, at
least without further research.
8.1.2 Households in Survey Analysis
Contra Klasen and Woolard (2000), but broadly in line with Maitra and Ray (2003b) and Ed-
monds et al. (2005), I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence that pension-receiving households attract an
inﬂux of working age individuals. Rather, the clear household composition response to public
transfer income is the migration of residents who, in the view of survey respondents, remain
household members. Deﬁning the household broadly to cater for migrant labour as an element
of aggregate, family labour supply, is therefore critical. More generally, migration responses in-
dicate that the “household” is a more fragile construct than often supposed, and that policy may
have the unintended consequence of affecting household composition. Survey-based analysis is
sensitive to the deﬁnition of the household, and needs to handle the possibility of endogenous
household formation, and changing household size and structure over time, with care.
8.2 Welfare Effects
Evidence that the pension induces labour supply responses does not imply that it imposes ef-
ﬁciency costs by distorting labour choices; optimisation demands variation in labour choice as
budget constraints and opportunity costs change, and deadweight losses arise only if transfers
drive an artiﬁcial wedge between marginal rates of substitution between choice variables (which
lump sum transfers do not do). Indeed, basic optimal income tax theory suggests that with per-
fect information, lump-sum transfers from high to low productivity, low income households
maximise social welfare without imposing efﬁciency costs. Without claiming that the OAP is
a pure lump sum transfer (it is imperfectly targeted, and funded out of general taxation, subject
to the usual distortions), the fact is that labour supply reducations are not an indication that the
OAP is inimical to maximising social welfare.
If policymakers’ aim is to maximise pensioner welfare, the fact that the labour supply of
working age household members is affected by the pension is clearly of immediate concern
(since it implies that non-pensioners capture part of the grant, reducing the beneﬁt of the in-
come transfer to pensioners, unless they are perfectly altruistic). If the OAP is intended to pro-
vide more general income support to the poor, the normative implications of negative labour
outcome effects depend upon policymakers’ goals. Given the lack of evidence that pension-
receiving households attract indigent relatives, it is safe to conclude that individuals in house-
holds receiving the OAP are unambiguously better off. Pensioners receive an income transfer
that, for most, is effectively conditional on only their age; thus, except if pension income crowds
out more than 100% of their pre-pension, intrahousehold resource allocation (surely unlikely),
they must be better off. For prime-age individuals, all else equal, nothing about additional non-
wage household income prejudices their ability to participate and ﬁnd employment. The fact
that employment (and perhaps participation) probabilities show some declines, therefore, sug-
gests that the pension enables a switch out of undesirable states (costly job search, unpleasant
employment).
One competing, non-welfarist goal might be to maximise household consumption. If pol-
icymakers’ are “consumptionist” in this way, the negative labour responses found here reduce
40the efﬁcacy of the OAP. How much? The following calculations are indicative:42
- Parametriccross-sectionandlongitudinalestimatessuggestadeclineintotalhouseholdlabour
participation (including migration) of perhaps 3% with the pension. With 2.16 prime-age in-
dividuals on average in OAP-receiving households, this implies an average reduction in partic-
ipants of 0.06. Prime-age employment probability, conditional on participation, in the total
sample is 0.53, and monthly earnings for the employed average 1,833.96 rand so the expected
loss in household income is 63 rand, or 8% of pension income (based on 1.1 pensioners in the
average OAP household, and maximum monthly pension payouts of 740 rand per month).
- Parametriccross-sectionandlongitudinalestimatessuggestadeclineintotalhouseholdprime-
age employment (including migration) of around 8%. With other ﬁgures as above, this implies
an expected total earnings loss of 318 rand, or 39% of total pension income.
Onaverage,theOAPthuscrowdsoutanon-trivialamountofprivateincome; toaconsumption-
maximising policymaker, the labour supply effects of the OAP reduce its efﬁcacy by close to
two-ﬁfths at the mean. But it is far from clear that consumption-maximisation is a compelling
public policy goal.
8.3 Labour Supply Effects
Increasing employment is perhaps the most pressing policy concern in South Africa. This is
compatible with a welfare maximisation paradigm if the positive effects of high employment in-
crease long-run social welfare under a more sophisticated measure than a simple, static trade-off
betweenconsumptionandleisure. HowinimicalaretheOAPeffectsfoundheretoemployment-
maximisation? Elasticity estimates suggest the strength of the OAP’s labour supply effects,
though LFS data constraints make the following calculations indicative only. The (point) prime-
age labour force participation and conditional employment elasticities, p and e, of pension



























with income estimated at 750 rand (median, total reported earned and transfer income), and us-
ing mean household prime-age participation and employment rates for non-OAP households.43
42Calculations in this and Section 8.3 are based on the 2004 LFS.
43Given that the LFS captures scant information on either household expenditure or income, these calculations
cannot be anything other than strictly indicative. Note too that calculation of individual elasticities is precluded by
41Both labour participation and employment look distinctly inelastic, and are much smaller than
those obtained by Bertrand et al. (2003), who ﬁnd (for individual residents, calculated by assum-
ing equal pension shares in the household) an e of -0.55.
These elasticities, of course, provide no indication of aggregate employment effects, which
cannot be quantiﬁed on the basis of the micro-level analysis conducted here. Ultimately, how-
ever, unambiguously high involuntary unemployment suggests that the constraint to raising
employment is not slack labour supply. Unless this changes, even a long-run oriented, social
welfare-maximising policymaker who prioritises employment has little reason to be seriously
concerned about the pension’s labour supply effects.
All of this said, the OAP does have negative associations with labour outcomes. Broadly-
deﬁned labour participation probability tests for reservation wage effects, made visible by vol-
untary drop-out from the labour market. Employment probability embeds any labour partici-
pation effects, as well as job search impacts. Since drops in employment probability are larger
and more robust than participation, results point in particular to reductions in job search inten-
sity. A number of factors should inform consideration of the implications of this ﬁnding.
8.3.1 Non-market Labour
Non-market production is not captured in the LFS, which recognises production of goods for
sale, and informal sector activity as labour supply, but excludes the labour of individuals whose
time is devoted to the production of household public goods (such as child-rearing and chores).
This treatment is correct insofar as measurable labour product is of prime interest, but does
mean that the labour versus leisure conception of time allocation, introduced in Section 3, is
simplistic. If the pension encourages more non-market labour within households, the results
exaggerate the extent to which pension income induces individuals to take more leisure.
8.3.2 Stronger Employment than Participation Effects
If the pension induced a strong increase in the desire for leisure, raising the reservation wage,
manyindividualsshouldreportthattheyhavedroppedoutofthelabourmarket; whilesomedo,
the probability of them doing so appears rather low (participation effects are small at best, and
sensitive to identiﬁcation strategy). Why, in other words, does access to pension income appear
to affect employment more than the participation decision? A straightforward explanation is
that that the pension tends to have only limited disincentive effects for work in general (the
desire to supply labour at a given wage), but makes job search and acquisition less desperately
urgent. Reduced job search intensity then leads to a fall in the probability of employment, all
else equal, on the order of 10% at most. Speculating, it is possible that much of this fall is
attributable to declines in the probability with which the very poor participate in subsistence,
informal sector activity, perhaps because the pension helps buy them the time and resources to
hold on for better opportunities. This is especially plausible in the light of some evidence of
high barriers to informal sector entry (Kingdon and Knight 2004b), and of minimal prospects
of transitioning from informal work, to more beneﬁcial formal sector work (Banerjee, Galiani,
Levinsohn and Woolard 2006).
An alternative possibility, also consistent with larger employment than participation effects,
is that access to pension income is governed not only by need, but by the perceptions of the
our ignorance of individuals’ shares of pension income.
42household members controlling the pension that the individual is doing what they can to reduce
that need. Such an individual—who in fact does not want to work—might be incentivised to
report that they want to work, but (clandestinely) limit search effort in order to retain access to
the pension while not suffering labour disutility.44
One unattractive feature of this idea is its reliance on gullible pensioners. But it is also incon-
sistent with another, strong empirical ﬁnding: the positive migration response to the pension.
This is hard to explain if the pension has a powerful, attenuating effect on desired participa-
tion, but is consistent with the ﬁrst explanation if the pension plays two roles in job search
determination; it may tend to generally reduce search intensity by providing an alternative sur-
vival strategy, but encourage another kind of search altogether—that subject to the most severe
liquidity constraints: migration for employment (as discussed in Section 3.5).
8.3.3 Implications of Migration as Successful Search
...you ﬁnd a friend and then start looking for work and ﬁnd it after three or four
months. Then you start coming home. – Anonymous young man, on time spent as a
migrant, KwaZulu-Natal Province, quoted in Mturi et al. (2005)
Given that the pension has a positive job search effect through migration, estimates of its nega-
tive employment probability effect could be exaggerated. The prime-age individuals most likely
to migrate may be those with the highest latent earnings potential (the brightest, healthiest, and
least risk-averse). As discussed, evidence suggests that most initially retain strong ties to their
households of origin, but successful migrants may eventually establish households of their own
in their place of (migrant) residency. Over time, this would generate a selection problem; the
pension could stimulate some job search, including migration, but in so doing lead to house-
hold fragmentation that causes this effect to disappear from the data. Many whose positive
employment status owe something to the pension would appear to live in non-pension receiving
households, while individuals observed to be living in pension-receiving households would be
a non-random sub-sample of the working age population, with a pre-disposition to poor labour
outcomes that is difﬁcult to control for.
While this paper ﬁnds robust evidence of a negative, net employment probability effect,
then, there is evidence of at least one positive job search effect—migration for work—and it must
be acknowledged that a selection problem (impossible to address without suitable, individual-
level panel data) may be inﬂating the estimates obtained.
44Discussed in Kingdon and Knight (2004b) and Section 3.5.
43TABLE 1: HOUSEHOLD DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, EXCLUDING MIGRANTS: MEANS (STD.
DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)
OAP Receipt Recorded: No Yes
Age-Eligible Members: None 1 or More None Male(s) Only Female(s) Only Both
Composition
Residents 3.56 4.76 5.38 4.35 5.05 6.10
(2.45) (2.79) (3.15) (2.76) (2.85) (3.26)
Children under 5 0.44 0.55 0.62 0.44 0.55 0.65
(0.73) (0.80) (0.93) (0.75) (0.84) (0.94)
Children 6 to 15 0.89 1.12 1.33 0.92 1.34 1.42
(1.19) (1.36) (1.39) (1.17) (1.38) (1.47)
Members 16 to 18 0.27 0.33 0.44 0.30 0.39 0.38
(0.53) (0.55) (0.70) (0.57) (0.63) (0.67)
Adults 19 to 21 0.25 0.28 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.31
(0.50) (0.54) (0.63) (0.59) (0.56) (0.58)
Adults 22 to 24 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.20 0.24 0.23
(0.46) (0.43) (0.53) (0.44) (0.50) (0.52)
Men 25 to 50 0.54 0.44 0.51 0.29 0.47 0.49
(0.62) (0.70) (0.75) (0.56) (0.71) (0.76)
Women 25 to 50 0.69 0.53 0.69 0.54 0.57 0.53
(0.63) (0.72) (0.83) (0.71) (0.74) (0.75)
Adults 51 up 0.27 1.31 1.04 1.35 1.18 2.10
(0.54) (0.48) (0.70) (0.52) (0.45) (0.32)
Mean age 27.38 37.34 30.12 43.20 35.71 41.53
(10.59) (15.07) (12.03) (17.74) (14.39) (14.73)
Assets
Proportion owning home 0.72 0.84 0.90 0.95 0.96 0.96
(0.45) (0.37) (0.29) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19)
Proportion owning TV 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.47
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Proportion with savings 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.58
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Highest education (yrs.) 10.45 9.95 9.94 9.12 9.88 9.98
(3.66) (4.39) (3.54) (4.63) (3.85) (3.90)
Labour and employment
Labour force participants 1.57 1.68 1.62 1.17 1.31 1.35
(1.08) (1.34) (1.49) (1.27) (1.30) (1.48)
Employed (no.) 0.88 0.81 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.44
(0.78) (0.86) (0.73) (0.77) (0.75) (0.73)
Unemployed (no.) 0.69 0.88 1.14 0.74 0.87 0.91
(0.95) (1.18) (1.34) (1.01) (1.09) (1.28)
Total earnings 1714.96 1168.54 514.57 476.47 501.75 462.84
(3606.94) (3110.24) (1368.74) (2014.06) (1505.96) (1360.55)
Total hours worked 39.55 34.58 19.39 16.35 17.89 16.87
(38.21) (39.58) (33.92) (30.34) (33.28) (31.26)
Observations 16741 422 377 617 2990 700
Total earnings are in rand per month. Total hours worked are weekly hours of market labour. Earnings and hours
apply to all household residents.
44TABLE 2: HOUSEHOLD DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, INCLUDING MIGRANTS: MEANS (STD.
DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)
OAP Receipt Recorded: No Yes
Age-Eligible Members: None 1 or More None Male(s) Only Female(s) Only Both
Migrants
Migrants 0.29 0.44 0.43 0.54 0.60 0.69
(0.68) (0.90) (0.91) (1.07) (1.03) (1.18)
Female migrants 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.29
(0.37) (0.48) (0.54) (0.55) (0.59) (0.69)
Male migrants 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.35 0.37 0.40
(0.49) (0.64) (0.63) (0.77) (0.73) (0.79)
Transfer per migrant (/yr.) 4022.50 2528.00 2501.66 1734.26 2044.82 2296.21
(7425.89) (3471.04) (3501.33) (2772.82) (3706.81) (8114.38)
HH composition and labour
HH Size 3.85 5.20 5.81 4.89 5.66 6.78
(2.65) (3.02) (3.40) (3.12) (3.11) (3.57)
19-50s & migrants 1.98 1.90 2.36 1.89 2.18 2.23
(1.26) (1.62) (1.79) (1.72) (1.69) (1.93)
Labour participants 1.86 2.12 2.05 1.70 1.91 2.03
(1.21) (1.48) (1.77) (1.69) (1.59) (1.82)
Employed (no.) 1.17 1.24 0.91 0.97 1.04 1.13
(0.93) (1.12) (1.22) (1.37) (1.25) (1.39)
Resident rates (prop. of 19-50 yr.-olds)
Total labour participation 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.69
(0.33) (0.37) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39)
Male labour participation 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.70
(0.33) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
Female labour participation 0.78 0.74 0.65 0.64 0.72 0.68
(0.38) (0.41) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42)
Total employed 0.49 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.17
(0.43) (0.38) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.31)
Male employed 0.57 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.19
(0.47) (0.43) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.36)
Female employed 0.39 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.16
(0.46) (0.40) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.33)
Total unemployed 0.33 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.52
(0.39) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Male unemployed 0.28 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.51
(0.43) (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45)
Female unemployed 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.52
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45)
Rates including migrants
Migrants 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.27
(0.21) (0.31) (0.19) (0.29) (0.33) (0.36)
Labour participants 0.83 0.77 0.52 0.66 0.76 0.78
(0.28) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.32) (0.32)
Employed 0.57 0.42 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.40
(0.38) (0.39) (0.30) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46TABLE 4: REGRESSIONS: MIGRATION
Pooled 2SLS Interact Male Migrants Female Migrants
Metro area  0.070  0.069  0.070  0.101  0.053
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
E Cape prov. 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.163 0.128
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
F State prov. 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.014 0.035
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
KZN prov. 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.117 0.049
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Limp. prov 0.176 0.175 0.176 0.258 0.115
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010)
Mpum. prov. 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.060 0.044
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
N Cape prov. 0.001 0.001 0.002  0.017 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
N West prov. 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.069 0.064
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
W Cape prov.  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.032  0.011+
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Isolated 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.027  0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Kids <5  0.055  0.053  0.055  0.019  0.060
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Kids 6-18  0.023  0.021  0.023 0.009  0.031
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
HH size (inc. migrants) 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.024 0.031
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Primary educ.  0.002  0.002  0.001 0.003  0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Some secondary educ.  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Secondary educ. 0.011+ 0.012 0.012+ 0.016+ 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Higher educ. 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.018+
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Other grants  0.017  0.016  0.017 0.023  0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
OAP 0.041 0.056
(0.007) (0.008)
Male OAP 0.008 0.013 0.021
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Female OAP 0.046 0.029 0.045
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
N 19945 19945 19945 15023 15502
Adj. R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.09
F test statistic 140.6 140.9 134.5 119.4 60.4
OLS regressions unless otherwise noted. Std. errors are adjusted for within-cluster correlation. +, ,  denote















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49TABLE 7: NON-PARAMETRIC [NP] AND SEMI-PARAMETRIC [SP] OAP IMPACT ESTIMATES:
LOCAL WALD ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Bandwidth RoT RoT0.5 RoT2
Model NP SP NP SP NP SP
HH size & composition
HH size 0.635 1.123 0.295 0.678+  0.003 0.448
(0.764) (0.703) (0.431) (0.412) (0.467) (0.461)
Children <6 0.433 0.566 0.215+ 0.323 0.104 0.224+
(0.202) (0.197) (0.123) (0.111) (0.136) (0.122)
Residents 0.254 0.415 0.138 0.247 0.129 0.258
(0.345) (0.346) (0.211) (0.212) (0.236) (0.230)
Residents 19-50 & migrants  0.133 0.049  0.022 0.134  0.268  0.076
(0.417) (0.425) (0.249) (0.243) (0.276) (0.263)
Migration
Pooled 0.020 0.042 0.022 0.032  0.026  0.019
(0.094) (0.084) (0.056) (0.049) (0.061) (0.053)
Male 0.060 0.121 0.065 0.115+ 0.016 0.060
(0.129) (0.123) (0.077) (0.073) (0.079) (0.076)
Female  0.029  0.024  0.020  0.028  0.064  0.072
(0.101) (0.095) (0.058) (0.055) (0.062) (0.059)
Participation
Pooled  0.019  0.045  0.007  0.020  0.034  0.050
(0.078) (0.078) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.050)
Male 0.108 0.090 0.120 0.116 0.062 0.058
(0.100) (0.098) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.064)
Female  0.160+  0.175+  0.126  0.136  0.135  0.150
(0.096) (0.097) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062)
Employment
Pooled 0.093 0.085 0.056 0.046  0.015  0.033
(0.105) (0.095) (0.063) (0.057) (0.067) (0.063)
Male 0.196 0.203 0.155+ 0.167+ 0.096 0.103
(0.139) (0.138) (0.083) (0.079) (0.088) (0.083)
Female  0.019  0.022  0.018  0.037  0.082  0.106
(0.124) (0.127) (0.072) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077)
N (total pooled sub-sample) 11142
+, ,  denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
50TABLE 8: OAP STATUS: 2002–2003 (NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS)
Unchanged Change
Neither Both Gained Lost
HH OAP 8,970 2,167 569 506
OAP men 11,239 544 226 203
OAP women 9,627 1,655 479 451
Balanced panel. HH OAP refers to whether or not the household receives any OAP income (regardless of source).
Changes in OAP men and women refer to changes in the number of age-eligible household members, in conjunction
with HH OAP status (e.g. the loss of a man who was age-eligible for the OAP in 2002, in a household which reported













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52TABLE 10: OLS DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES REGRESSIONS: HOUSEHOLD LABOUR PAR-
TICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT
1. Participation 2. Employment
Pooled Men Women Pooled Men Women
Isolated  0.008 0.016+  0.038 0.055 0.079 0.026
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Kids<5 0.032 0.071 0.002 0.042 0.145  0.033
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Kids 6–18 0.019 0.027 0.012 0.055 0.081 0.037
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HH size  0.026  0.029  0.020  0.064  0.080  0.041
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Primary educ. 0.002  0.005 0.020  0.036  0.019  0.050
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023)
Some secondary educ.  0.022  0.044 0.027  0.094  0.090  0.058
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Secondary educ. 0.016  0.017 0.075  0.059  0.071 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Higher educ. 0.031  0.011 0.099 0.111 0.046 0.243
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
Other grants  0.081  0.087  0.052  0.145  0.135  0.104
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Time (2003=1) 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
OAP  0.013  0.024  0.009  0.026  0.071 0.025
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
OAP  time  0.017  0.004  0.018  0.074  0.043  0.110
(0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028)
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17859 13896 13459 17859 13896 13459
Adj. R2 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.08
F test statistic 46.70 30.53 19.66 120.97 76.43 59.38
“OAP” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the HH acquires OAP income between surveys, and 0 if the HH does not
receive OAP income in either survey. Std. errors adjust for within-household correlation across periods. +, , 
denote signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
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FIG. 2: HH EXPENDITURE BY OAP STATUS











Rand per month. Expenditure categories from survey.


















































50 55 60 65 70
Age of Oldest Household Member
Oldest Person is Female Oldest Person is Male
Reference lines indicate OAP age eligibility.



























0 20 40 60 80 100
Age
Non−OAP HHs OAP HHs
Epanechnikov kernel estimates. Bandwidth: 2.5.
FIG. 5: MEAN PREDICTED LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES (POOLED SPECIFICATION, TA-
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Clockwise from top left: RoT bandwidth, RoT0.5, RoT2. Taken from household size calculation; assignment probability
estimates vary slightly by outcome variable, due to small sample size changes.
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59FIG.12: HYPOTHETICAL DISCONTINUITY TESTS: FEMALE LABOUR PARTICIPATION WITH
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63A Unsmoothed Discontinuity Data (Means and 95% Conﬁdence
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